Institutional framework, corporate ownership structure, and R&D investment: An international analysis
We combine agency theory with the law and finance approach to analyze how the legal protection of investors and the corporate ownership structure affect corporate investment in research and development (R&D). We use information from 956 firms from the five most R&D-intensive industries in 19 developed countries. Our results show that better protection of investors’ rights by the institutional environment has a positive influence on corporate R&D. We also find that corporate ownership concentration works as a substitute for legal protection. This finding means that R&D investment of the firms in the countries with poor legal protection increases as ownership becomes more concentrated. Our results also show that the identity of shareholders has a relevant effect: Whereas banks and nonfinancial institutions as shareholders result in lower R&D, institutional investors as shareholders increase corporate investment in R&D.
This article is an attempt to highlight the issues, associated with a latency of crimes under Art. 170 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and to propose mechanisms to detect these criminal violations. The author analyzes the reasons hindering the identification of the crimes, described in the article. In the present article also discusses the features of investigative jurisdiction of a crime under Art. 170 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which may also influence the degree of latency of this crime.
The author of article, E.P.Gavrilov, doctor of sciences, professor of the chair of the civil law of the state university Нigher school of economy proves that the legal protection of the discoveries and innovation proposals in Russia is not and should not be present.
We study the relationship between SMS (small medium size) firm ownership structure and obstacle to finance. The empirical research considers both the concentration of the company's ownership (controlling owner) and the presence of foreign participants in the equity capital. Our aim is to identify those determinants of financial markets (bond market development), legal institutions and firms characteristics in the transition economies of the post soviet countries that can be considered as barriers to attracting financial resources. This paper sheds light on large shareholders’ influence on obstacle to finance.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.