Конкуренция по Курно и по Бертрану: выбор стратегической переменной на примере автомобильного рынка России
The paper analyzes oligopolistic competition in a market for a differentiated product. A comparative analysis of competition models by Cournot (output competition) and Bertrand (price competition) under prerequisites put forward by the authors shows that under Bertrand competition the price level will be lower. Whereas interrelation between firms output and profit is ambiguous (if goods produced are substitutes), and depend, other things being equal, on the attractiveness of the good offered by the firm. The results obtained are illustrated using Russia’s automotive market review. In particular, an attempt is made to classify some decisions made by car producers as the one or the other competition strategy analyzed in the theoretical part of the paper.
In article the market of cars before crisis, features of its growth on a boundary of centuries is considered, manufacturers are investigated world production of vehicles on segments and the largest companies. Change of manufacture of cars for last 20 years is shown. Dynamics of structure of the market of cars in Russia in 2001-2008 is analyzed considered, how modern crisis will affect repartition of the world market of cars and the tendency of its development (in countries and price aspects). Authors do the short-term and long-term forecast of development of the Russian market of cars.
This is the first paper on consumer search where the cost of going back to stores already searched is explicitly taken into account. We show that the optimal sequential search rule under costly second visits is very different from the traditional reservation price rule in that it is nonstationary and not independent of previously sampled prices. We explore the implications of costly second visits on market equilibrium in two celebrated search models. In the Wolinsky model some consumers search beyond the first firm and in this class of models costly second visits do make a substantive difference: equilibrium prices under costly second visits can both be higher and lower than their perfect recall analogues. In the oligopoly search model of Stahl where consumers do not search beyond the first firm, there remains a unique symmetric equilibrium that has firms use pricing strategies that are identical to the perfect recall case.
We examine an equilibrium concept for 2-person non-cooperative games with boundedly rational agents which we call Nash-2 equilibrium. It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not only current strategies but also all profitable next-stage responses of the partners to her deviation from the current profile that reduces her relevant choice set. We provide a condition for Nash-2 existence in finite games and complete characterization of Nash-2 equilibrium in strictly competitive games. Nash-2 equilibria in Hotelling price-setting game are found and interpreted in terms of tacit collusion.
We study Bertrand competition models with incomplete information about rivals' costs, where uncertainty is given by independent identically distributed random variables. It turns out that Bayesian Nash equilibria of the simplest of these games are described as Cournot prices. Then we discuss general conditions when Cournot prices give Bayesian Nash equilibria for Bertrand games with incomplete information about rivals' costs.
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рысында пайдаланылуына басты назар аударылады. Экономист-аналитик-
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The article considers the processes of progress in production and service sectors and answers the question how and thanks to what service sector of Russian economy left the productive one behind (concerning contribution in GDP of our country). The rates of development of service sector turned out to be so high firstly - as a reason of peculiarities of new Russian economy, which historically was built on the market principles and was developing in conditions of investment resources deficit, secondly - as a reason of system differences between «physical» goods and services as an object of sale. Nowadays Russia faces an unusual symbiosis: effective service companies, operating in hard competitive sphere with average profitability and non-affective from the point of management industrial companies, which thanks to monopolistic pricing have great profitability, providing profits of Russian budget and determining a macroeconomic situation.
Brands and brand management have become a central feature of the modern economy and a staple of business theory and business practice. Contrary to the law's conception of trademarks, brands are used to indicate far more than source and/or quality. This volume begins the process of broadening the legal understanding of brands by explaining what brands are and how they function, how trademark and antitrust/competition law have misunderstood brands, and the implications of continuing to ignore the role brands play in business competition. This is the first book to engage with the topic from an interdisciplinary perspective, hence it will be a must-have for all those interested in the phenomenon of brands and how their function is recognized by the legal system. The book integrates both a competition and an intellectual property law dimension and explores the regulatory environment and case law in both Europe and the United States.
The paper explores how EU competition law has integrated so far the concept of brands in different areas of enforcement. Although EU competition law has engaged in multiple instances with branding and product differentiation, brands do not yet constitute an operational concept in EU competition law. This is due to an important uncertainty as to the normative choices that need to be made with regard to the relation between brands and the formation of consumer preferences. The concerns raised by retailer power and the development of private labels also indicate that the existing economic theory on product differentiation may not also provide a complete picture on the effects of brands on the competitive process and ultimately on consumers. Competition law will also need to tackle the issues raised by the development of ‘social branding’ and the dialogic interaction between brand owners and consumers in the constitution of their brand identity.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.