О теории конституционного толкования Мишеля Тропера и о его споре с Отто Пферсманном
In the present article the author examines the basic theses and methodological postulates of the neorealist theory by a contemporary French legal theoretician and constitutionalist Michel Troper. The author stresses actuality of this theory for better understanding of approaches which are developed in the contemporary legal science to conceive of nature of constitutional interpretation, of the role a judge plays in interpretation and the limits of her liberty therein. Examination of the neorealist theory is followed by a short analysis of the debates between Michel Troper and another outstanding French legal scholar of our days, Otto Pfersmann.
The author of this article restarts the polemics around the realist theory of interpretation. Examining the thesis of this theory about identity of legal interpretation and jurisdictional decision-making, the author proves that confusion between these two different phenomena is based on incorrect use of the term “interpretation”. In the article are discussed six meanings of this term, at least present in legal interpretation, and each meaning must be used in the appropriate context. Undue confusion between these meanings enables the partisans of the realist theory of interpretation to construct “interpretation” as a notion without clear conceptual limits. This argument is designated by the author as an onomastic sophism, as a rhetoric stratagem based on the idea that a term has the same meaning in different contexts. The author repudiates the thesis forwarded by the realists that it is impossible to cognize meaning of legal texts, and draws on the incoherence of this argumentation which lastly recognizes a possibility to attribute a meaning through a judicial decision. In general, as O. Pfersmann argues, the realist theory of interpretation intends to justify changes in constitution through judicial argumentation without considering the order prescribed by the constitution for changes and amendments.
This short analysis of the case-law of the RF CC allows distinguishing several pivotal axes around which is centred the argumentation of that Court. First, it is the constitutional order that delimits the freedoms of legal subjects with some mandatory requirements and this way makes triumph the collective over the individual. In the same vein the Court agrees to restrict the freedoms for the sake of national security that guarantees survival and development of the society. Nonetheless, collective rights are not equivalent to the collective interests (volonté générale, if to follow the terms of J.-J. Rousseau), these latter are represented not by collectives but by the State that stands both over the individuals and the collectives. The State may in its activities be guided by the underpinning social conventions, but this guidance is limited by the principle of reasonableness following which the State (in fact, its agents) can decide about the extent to which they are ready to recognise these social conventions as reasons for action. It can be interfered that in this aspect one may assert that in the reasoning of the RF CC the collective interest prevails over the individual one, and the both are subordinated to the reasonable guidance of the State.
The author of this paper responds to the critique of the realist theory of interpretation made by O. Pfersmann. M. Troper insists that critique of his theory is based on the incorrect philosophical generalizations. The realist theory considers that it is impossible to find an objective meaning of legal texts also through judicial process. Thus, claiming at the same time that judicial decisions are the main source of knowledge about law and that these decisions do not have objective meaning does not lead to any internal contradictions in this theory.
In this article the author examines the problems connected with definition of nature of constitutional interpretation. On the base of the cases from the judicial practice, Michel Troper shows that specificity of constitutional interpretation does not reside in particular character of constitution which is the object of interpretation. According to this French theorist who is leader of the school of French legal realism, the particular trait of constitutional interpretation is due to the fact that this kind of interpretation results in constructing a hierarchy of normative acts in a given legal order. Even if such a hierarchy is described in a constitution, it will nevertheless remain hypothetical and subject to changes through an act of constitutional interpretation. Michel Troper insists that a meaning of a legal text cannot be defined prior to interpretation; therefore this legal text will not have any definitive content before being interpreted. The French theorist concludes that a legal norm is not created by the way of legislation — it is created through authentic interpretation of the legislative acts. As authentic interpretation the author holds such construction of a legal text which brings any legally relevant consequences having binding force in this given legal order, there consequences being immune to overruling by any higher instance. Such interpretation can be exercised both by judicial and non-jurisdictional bodies.
The article is devoted to a particular form of freedom of assembly — the right to counter-demonstrate. The author underlines the value of this right as an element of democratic society, but also acknowledges the risk of violent actions among participants of opposing demonstrations. Due to this risk, the government may adopt adequate measures restricting the right to counter-demonstrate, certain types of which are analyzed in this paper.
Development of standards of international controllability is reviewed in the article. Institutional approach is applied to development of international legal regime of Energy Charter. Definition of controllability is connected to development of international standards of dispute settlement, which are described in the article in detail. In connection with controllability, Russian interest, defense of investment in European Union and ecological investment encouragement, is reviewed in the article.
мировое управление и управляемость, Мировая экономика, международное экономическое право, энергетическая хартия, International control and controllability, International economics, international economic law, Energy Charter
международное частное право; недвижимость; ; школа бартолистов; бартолисты; теория статутов; статуарная теория/