Эпистемологический конструктивизм и проблема глобального наблюдателя
One of the key aspects of constructivism is the role of the observer and observation. I share this perspective, but beyond that I try to open up some problematic consequences of the core philosophical assumptions of globally observing existence. An additional conclusion could be drawn that in fact we can only speak reasonably about local observations, leaving out the issue of an external reality.
I am expanding a notion about PL-metaphysics by introducing the approach of Hegel, whom I regard as the chief PL-metaphysician in the entire history of philosophy. I am also proposing another substantiation of the division of metaphysics, namely, the criterion of transparency/opacity of system settings, which I consider the most symptomatic for the differentiation of epistemologies and believe that it plays the key role in understanding the status of constructivism itself. By applying this criterion, we can differentiate Transcendentalism and Naturalism as two substantial epistemological meta-programs and show that constructivism will still remain a part of the Transcendental program even in case of orientation towards PL-metaphysics, while Hegel's version of PL-metaphysics will be considered a part of Naturalism.
The conception of embodied, embedded, extended and enactive cognition (the so-called 4E cognition), the foundation of which was laid by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, Andy Clark, Alva Noë and others, is becoming increasingly popular nowadays in cognitive science, philosophy of mind and epistemology. The holistic view of cognition and activity of a cognizing subject is under development. Instead of the former dichotomy and sharp division of subject and object, of mind and body of a knowing creature, an organism, and environment of its life and cognition, their integration and cyclic determination are being justified. The subject and object of cognition are in a certain cyclical and mutually determining relationship: they are co-emerging and renewing from each other emergent entities. Mind, or consciousness, is embodied, bodily determined, whereas the body is intelligent, cognizing, body lives, moves, acts and knows. The rigid separation of a living organism and environment that is known and mastered by it has been also overcome: the body of a living organism is distributed; it is embedded in the environment, which is in part the world created by it, converted to its own needs. The subject of cognition, or cognitive agent, whether human or animal, is viewed as an active and interactive one: it is actively built into an environment; its cognitive activity is accomplished through its en-action and building into the surrounding world, i.e. its en-activation. Cognition, including perception, thinking, and imagination, is closely connected with action. Within the framework of this conception, it is possible to bridge the gap between life sciences, such as the theory of biological evolution, neurophysiology, the theory of psychomotor action, and the philosophical theory of cognition (epistemology) and to understand life, cognition and action of mind in their harmonious interactions and in their relationship to the phenomenological studies of personal experience and subjectivity of man.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.