Ограничивающие конкуренцию соглашения между участниками конкурсных торгов: российская практика
Non-competitive behavior of auction participants is a serious problem, leading to losses of economic efficiency of projects where the mechanism is used. Such violations are quite common in Russia and are traditionally in the focus of attention of antitrust authority. In practice, the prosecution of competition-restricting agreements is often problematic, given the diversity of their forms and underdeveloped standards of proof. This, in turn, weakens the deterrent effect of antitrust prohibitions.
The purpose of the article is to assess the role of the parameters of the auctions and standards of proof applied in the Russian antitrust investigations which they play in opposition to the conclusion of the competition-restricting agreements in competitive bidding. To achieve this goal in this study we generalize the results of theoretical studies devoted to the analysis of collusion in auctions. We also analyze the most common violations of the antitrust law by auction participants found in the Russian practice. The case study method is used to identify the parameters of the auctions, facilitating entering into competition-restricting agreements, as well as problematic issues related to attracting bidders to justice for anti-competitive behaviour.
Despite over 30 years of worldwide reforms in many directions to increase efficiency, public transport markets present a variety of arrangements regarding operations, control and ownership that are amenable to improvement. This workshop will examine the contextual economic, political, cultural and social factors behind these many different cases that can be observed around the world. Through a better understanding of such factors it will examine the competition and ownership options for regulated public transport markets, taking full account of local contextual factors. This will include examination of methods for improving performance without major competition and ownership changes, for example by improved institutional design (both top-down and bottom-up), the development of trusting partnerships, the promotion of negotiated contracts and the introduction of optimal operating rules.
There is by now a large literature arguing that auctions with a variety of after-market interactions may not yield an efficient allocation of the objects for sale, especially when the bidders impose strong negative externalities upon each other. In this note, we argue that these inefficiencies can be avoided by asking bidders prior to the auction to submit any publicly observable payment they would like to make. These payments, so-called flexible entry fees, do not affect the allocation decision of the auctioneer. We show that auctions with flexible entry fees have a fully revealing equilibrium where bidders signal their type before the auction itself takes place.
This is the first paper on consumer search where the cost of going back to stores already searched is explicitly taken into account. We show that the optimal sequential search rule under costly second visits is very different from the traditional reservation price rule in that it is nonstationary and not independent of previously sampled prices. We explore the implications of costly second visits on market equilibrium in two celebrated search models. In the Wolinsky model some consumers search beyond the first firm and in this class of models costly second visits do make a substantive difference: equilibrium prices under costly second visits can both be higher and lower than their perfect recall analogues. In the oligopoly search model of Stahl where consumers do not search beyond the first firm, there remains a unique symmetric equilibrium that has firms use pricing strategies that are identical to the perfect recall case.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market. Non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan.
This paper examines determinants of corruption across Russian regions. Key contributions include: (i) a formal study of economic corruption determinants across Russian regions; (ii) comparisons of determinants of perceived corruption versus those of actual corruption; and (iii) studying the influence of market competition and other factors on corruption. The re-sults show that economic prosperity, population, market competition and urbanization are significant determinants of Russian corruption. The use of alternative corruption measures reveals that economic prosperity and population have a largely similar impact on corrup-tion perceptions and corruption incidence. However, there are significant differences in the effects of competition and urbanization.
This study analyzes the effects of reducing trade barriers in the context of the objectives of competition policy. Separate chapters are devoted to the assessment of the height of Russian trade barriers, the analysis of the impact of international trade on domestic prices and concentration of production.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.