Investor Myopia and Persistence Of The Global Crisis: A Post Keynesian View
The main idea of the paper is that the persistence of the current global crisis can be explained by phenomenon of investor myopia. When agents exclude from the consideration values of future variables after some “threshold” time point they may refuse from investing in durable productive assets. So, investor myopia – as an extreme form of short-termism – inhibits long-run economic development and can prolong crisis.
The underlying causes of investor myopia have institutional and cultural nature and exert influence on the human behavior with time lags.
On the one hand, investor myopia is a reaction on the higher uncertainty due to ineffective institutions leading to a lack of enforcement or lack of punishment for opportunistic behavior. These aspects are very serious problem in some post-socialist countries like Russia or Ukraine. On the other hand, investor myopia is a reflection of values of economic culture emphasizing the importance of maximizing short-term financial gains and/or current consumption. It means that in the developed countries investor myopia can be a product of both evolution of money manager capitalism (including financialization
Crisis as a phase of an economic cycle is of most interest. Study of crises in historical retrospective is necessary for understanding of the main mechanisms, regularities and causes of crisis phenomena. The article deals with the history of the world economic crises and classification of their causes.
Desde la perspectiva de la autora del presente estudio, esta última visión explica las recurrentes y cada vez más profundas crisis financieras del último tercio de siglo XX —especialmente la gran debacle económica de 2008—, que los gobiernos han enfrentado con políticas económicas erróneas porque, sin tener en cuenta la génesis de estos fenómenos, en lugar de generar crecimiento económico han priorizado el “rescate” de las instituciones financieras.
The conference is organized in collaboration with Polish Economic Society Branch in Toruń and Brno University of Technology (Czech Republic), BA School of Business and Finance (Latvia), Daugavpils University (Lithuania), Pereyaslav-Khmelnitsky Hryhoriy Skovoroda State Pedagogical University (Ukraine), University of Angers (France), University of Pablo de Olavide (Spain), University of Latvia (Latvia). The conference is addressed to economist from all European Union countries and Eastern Europe. It aims to bring together economists form Western, Central and Eastern Europe to discuss issues in economics, finance and business management. Main conference tracks include: 1. Macroeconomics; Microeconomics; Econometrics; International Economics 2. Financial markets; Labour markets; Institutions; 3. Business environment; Management and Marketing.
Using data on foreign borrowing, I identify Russian banks that were affected by the sudden stop of external financing caused by the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Applying the difference-in-difference method, I compare these «affected» banks to «unaffected» ones and find that the Russian Central Bank’s (CBR) anti-crisis financial assistance primarily went to the former group. Tracing the impact of the CBR’s liquidity infusions on banks’ portfolio allocation decisions, I find that banks used CBR funds not only to pay out foreign debt, but also to accumulate cash deposits in non-resident banks. I also find that affected banks increased their holdings of market securities significantly more than unaffected ones, which suggests that the CBR’s bailout policies impacted their risk-taking strategies. While there was no significant difference in corporate lending growth between the two groups after the sudden stop, lending to borrowers with weaker banking relationships (individuals and entrepreneurs) decreased more among affected banks.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.