Alliance incentives under the D’Hondt method
A cooperative finite-stage dynamic n-person prisoner's dilemma is considered. The time-consistent subset of the core is proposed. The Shapley value for the stochastic model of the n-person prisoner's dilemma is calculated in explicit form.
In order to find an optimal and time consistent cooperative path in multicriteria multistage game the minimal sum of relative deviations rule is introduced. Using this rule one can construct a vector-valued characteristic function that is weakly superadditive. The sustainability of the cooperative agreement is ensured by using an imputation distribution procedure (IDP) based approach. We formulate the conditions an IDP should satisfy to guarantee that the core is strongly time consistent (STC). Namely, if the imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value satisfies the efficiency condition, the strict balance condition and the strong irrational-behavior-proof condition, given that the Shapley value belongs to the core of each subgame along the cooperative path, it can be used as a “supporting imputation” which guarantees that the whole core is STC. We discuss three payment schedules and check whether they can be used as supporting imputation distribution procedures for the considered multicriteria game.
We use the imputation distribution procedure approach to ensure sustainable cooperation in a multistage game with vector payoffs. In order to choose a particular Pareto optimal and time consistent strategy profile and the corresponding cooperative trajectory we suggest a refined leximin algorithm. Using this algorithm we design a characteristic function for a multistage multicriteria game. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions for strong time consistency of the core.
We deal with multistage multicriteria games in extensive form and employ so-called “A-subgame” concept to examine dynamical properties of some non-cooperative and cooperative solutions. It is proved that if we take into account only the active players at each A-subgame the set of all strong Pareto equilibria is time consistent but does not satisfy dynamical compatibility.
We construct an optimal cooperative trajectory and vector-valued characteristic function using the refined leximin algorithm. To ensure the sustainability of a cooperative agreement we design the A-incremental imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value which provides a better incentive for cooperation than classical incremental allocation procedure. This specific payment schedule corresponds to the A-subgame concept satisfies time consistency and efficiency condition and implies non-zero current payment to the active player immediately after her move.
Measuring indirect importance of various attributes is a very common task in marketing analysis for which researchers use correlation and regression techniques. We have listed and illustrated some common problems with widely used latent importance measures. A more theoretically sound approach – the Shapley Value decomposition – was applied to a rich data set of US internet stores. The use of store-level data instead of respondent-level data allowed us to reveal the factors, which are powerful in explaining, why some stores have higher rates of willingness to make repeat purchases than the others. By confronting the indirect importance and performance measures for three different internet stores, we have revealed strengths, weaknesses, attributes that the company should bring customers’ attention to and attributes improvement of which is not of a high priority.
This paper is devoted to modern approaches to the estimation of external conflict in the theory of evidence based on axioms. The conflict measure is defined on the set of beliefs obtained from several sources of information. It is shown that the conflict measure should be a monotone set function with respect to sets of beliefs. Some robust procedures for evaluation of conflict measure that are stable to small changes in evidences are introduced and discussed. The analysis of conflict among forecasts about the value of shares of Russian companies of investment banks is presented. In this analysis the conflict measure estimates inconsistency of recommendations of investment banks, while the Shapley values of this measure on the set of evidences characterize the contribution of each investment bank to the overall conflict. The relationship between conflict and precision of forecasts is also investigated.
Smoking is a problem, bringing signifi cant social and economic costs to Russiansociety. However, ratifi cation of the World health organization Framework conventionon tobacco control makes it possible to improve Russian legislation accordingto the international standards. So, I describe some measures that should be taken bythe Russian authorities in the nearest future, and I examine their effi ciency. By studyingthe international evidence I analyze the impact of the smoke-free areas, advertisementand sponsorship bans, tax increases, etc. on the prevalence of smoking, cigaretteconsumption and some other indicators. I also investigate the obstacles confrontingthe Russian authorities when they introduce new policy measures and the public attitudetowards these measures. I conclude that there is a number of easy-to-implementanti-smoking activities that need no fi nancial resources but only a political will.
One of the most important indicators of company's success is the increase of its value. The article investigates traditional methods of company's value assessment and the evidence that the application of these methods is incorrect in the new stage of economy. So it is necessary to create a new method of valuation based on the new main sources of company's success that is its intellectual capital.