Кролик, шляпа и мистическое
In his “Essay on Absurd” Albert Camus writes that the only important philosophical question is whether life is worth living. There is a well-known alternative behind this question: either our life has a fundamental meaning, or life is basically absurd. In other terms, God either exists or does not exist. Since the time of Socrates, philosophical thought has constantly developed this alternative in many different variations: classical philosophy preferred the religious (let's call it so) picture of the world, the non-classical tradition tended toward a secular understanding of reality. In modern philosophy, such issues are discussed in an analytical way, the appeal to the classical formulation of the question now has, rather, historical and philosophical significance. The general mood of our era, bearing in mind both Western culture and Russia, most likely, should be called secular; the only area of research relevant to the “important issue” - analytical theology - is a rather closed research system that does not have a decisive influence on the spiritual atmosphere of modern society. In this connection, it may be useful to clarify some issues related to the alternative mentioned. To do this, let us turn to the studies of Wittgenstein, whose ideas, in my opinion, put serious restrictions on philosophical and earthbound atheism.
This article considers the problem of defining the concept of "Austrian philosophy" in the context of the possible influence of Austrian philosophy of the XIX century on the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. From Haller&Neurath’s point of view the Austrian philosophical tradition can be represented as a single chain of mutual influences. In particular, we can trace continuity, find common features in the philosophy of the Brentano school and philosophy of the Vienna Circle. But here is the question. Should Ludwig Wittgenstein also be included in this tradition? By responding to this question, we can better understand the boundaries of this tradition. But in case we include Wittgenstein in this tradition, then he will be in one tradition with Alexius Meinong, who is often called Wittgenstein's opponent in logic, semantics and philosophical psychology. Therefore, our task is to find out whether these theories are really so different. May be we can find common features or signs of the influence of one theory on another. The main clue in this case is the concept of "Sachverhalt" or "state of affairs", which Wittgenstein used in "Tractatus" and which is quite comparable in meaning with the Meinong’s concept of "objektiv".
The article is the first in Russian-speaking literature analysis of Wittgenstein’s "Lecture about ethics" (1929) sustained in a format of polemic with the long-held interpretations of Wittgenstein’s thought. The subject of discussion of these treatments is Wittgenstein's position concerning the status of the highest (ethical) meanings and values. In the article it is shown that Wittgenstein's statements have not a theoretical, but methodical character: Wittgenstein does not claim and does not deny existence of "the highest", he creates the optics in which something is directly detected, which is irreducible to the "trivial" contexts. This method, being mastered, can have the broadest application, allowing to trace the uncommon axiological and semantic components in all cases of their manifestation: in philosophical doctrines, in literature, in political debates, in own experiences, etc. In the last part of article it is shown how Wittgenstein's method discloses the inadequacy of the program of positivism: criticizing the "naive" absolutism of pre-scientific forms of culture (myth, religion, ethics, metaphysics), positivism does not recognize the uncommon contents inherent in these forms and therefore positivism finds it possible to reduce these forms just to the facts, leveling, thereby, their genuine meaning.
It turns out, however, that in spite of one basic difference there runs between these two systems a deep and striking parallelism. This parallelism is so close indeed that it makes possible the construction of a vocabulary which would transform characteristic propositions of Wittgenstein's ontology into Aristotelian ones, and conversely. To show in some detail the workings of that transformation will be the subject of this paper.
The collection includes articles devoted to actual problems of humanitarian knowledge: unity and variety of norms in culture, specifics of normativity in the spheres of thinking, perception, practice. The issue is addressed to scholars, postgraduates and students of humanitarian specialities.
The professor of Catholic University San Antonio (Spain) Joaquin Jareno Alarcon`s book "Religion and relativism in the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein" - one of the possible interpretations of the ideas and attitudes of great Austrian philosopher, an attempt to extract the religious perspective from his controversial legacy, hidden behind the logical categories. The author analyzes in detail the sources of Wittgenstein`s religious thinking; discussions around the relativistic (fideist) interpretations, the Austrian philosopher`s contribution in philosophy and logic of language in general and religious ethics, in particular.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.