Our aim is to propose a non-referential semantics for the principle of logical charity: neither logical absolutism (one logic, one way of thinking), nor logical relativism (several logics, several ways of thinking) afford an adequate conceptual framework to interpret the meaning of any speech act. But neither of them is totally wrong, either. The point is to see to what extent each of these views is partly right, thus leading to a more consensual but seemingly paradoxical ‘relative principle of charity’. After recalling the theoretical background of logical charity, we suggest a fourvalued logic of acceptance and rejection (hereafter: AR4) to extend the classical view of charity; then we explain how such a non-referential semantics does justice both to the initial champions of logical charity and their opponents. While endorsing coherence as a precondition for rationality, we argue that such a criterion does not entail that classical logic is a necessary conceptual scheme to interpret the others’ beliefs. A better application of charity should take account of the questions implicitly asked by a statement; we proceed in this way by preferring Quine’s verdict-functions to his logical truth-functions while emphasizing upon the varying degrees of strength of a statement.
The metasemantic version of two-dimensionalism developed by R. Stalnaker is considered in the connection with the opposition "logic as calculus" vs. "logic as uversal medium". Some philosophical and methodological advantages of such approach are pointed out.
The paper considers semantic structure of emotion causatives and their interaction with negation, namely, its narrow or wide scope. Emotion causatives are defined as a group of causatives with their specific semantic properties that distinguish them from other groups of causatives. One of those properties concerns their relation with corresponding decausatives, which, unlike causatives, do not license wide scope of negation. There are several factors that enable negation to have scope over the causative element in emotion causatives – their imperfective aspect, generic referential status of the causative NP phrase, agentivity and conativity of the causative. Non-agentive causatives never license the negation of the causative component. Agentive conative causatives license the negation of the causative component more frequently and easily than agentive non-conative causatives, prompting the assumption that in their semantic structures the causative component has different statuses (assertion in the former, presupposition in the latter). It also has different forms for conatives and non-conatives. Conativity vs. non-conativity of emotion causatives is related to the emotion type, with conative synthetic causatives being limited to basic emotions. The greatest degree of conativity and, hence, the assertive status of the causative component characterizes three emotion causatives – zlit’ ‘to make mad’, veselit’ ‘to cheer up’, and pugat’ ‘to frighten’.
Key words: causative, decausative, agentive, conative, intentional, presupposition, assertion, semantic structure, basic emotions
History of concepts "phlogiston" and "oxygen" shows applicability of Quine's indeterminacy of translation thesis to the problem of presentism in historiography of science. It is argued that this thesis speaks in favor of pluralism in historiography of science.
The purpose of this essay is to explore the prospects for the use and development of Thompson Clarke’s ideas from his well-known paper, “The Legacy of Skepticism.” The paper is particularly concerned with Clarke’s criticism of the so-called “standard human-conceptual constitution,” which provides a ground for the distinction between plain questions of ordinary life and a philosophical intellectual quest. In support of Clarke’s criticism, it is compared to Donald Davidson’s criticism of scheme-content dualism. Moreover, the paper provides an assessment of G. E. Moore’s arguments against philosophical skepticism, which can be applied to a critical study of metaphysical preconditions in contemporary epistemology and for elaborating on the extended conception of “ordinary.” The main conclusion of the paper is that skepticism, being the logical result of these preconditions, mostly depends on the distinction between pure logical and epistemological possibilities, which is presupposed by the very idea of a conceptual scheme. This distinction is the basis for drawing radical and intuitive skeptical conclusions.
The Jain saptabhaṅgī is well-known for its general stance of non-one-sidedness. After a number of debates about the occurrence of contradictory sentences inside the so-called "Jain logic", three main theses are presented in the following: the saptabhaṅgī is a theory of judgment giving an exhaustive list of possible statements; it is not a "logic" in the modern sense of the word, given that no consequence relation appears in it; the Jain saptabhaṅgī can be viewed as a dual of the Madhyamaka catuṣkoṭi, where four possible statements are equally denied. A formal semantics is proposed to account for these theses, namely: a Question-Answer Semantics, in which a basic question-answer game makes sense of every statement with the help of structured logical values. Some new light will be also thrown upon the controversial notion of avaktavyam: instead of being taken as a case of true contradiction, our semantics will justify a reduction of the Jain theory of non-one-sidedness to a one-valued system of question-answer games.
La position résolument extensionaliste de Quine a été appuyée par des arguments de nature différente, dans ses multiples articles destinés à rejeter le projet de logique modale. On peut classer ces arguments en trois catégories : un argument naturaliste, où l’auteur tente de baser le langage scientifique sur une notation tâchée de décrire la “structure ultime de la réalité” ; un argument esthétique, où Quine fait allusion à des raisons de clarté et d’efficacité démonstrative pour privilégier la théorie des fonctions de vérité ; un argument pratique, dans la mesure où Quine défend la logique classique sur la base du “principe de mutilation minimum”. A travers une étude de ses écrits relatifs aux attitudes propositionnelles, nous montrerons que la philosophie de la logique de Quine a prolongé la partie épistémologique de son oeuvre, optant finalement pour une stratégie de réduction naturaliste des intensions, à l’image du mouvement engagé par Word and Object et prolongé par From Stimulus to Science. Ce projet se soldera par un échec relatif, et Quine résumera cette désillusion par un fossé entre les structures du langage et du monde : la thèse du “monisme anomal” de Davidson sera le dernier mot, amer, du défenseur acharné de la logique classique.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.