Стоимость банков России перед кризисом 2008 г.: был ли пузырь?
The phenomenon of high value banks in Russia before the crisis is being explored. Prices were irrationally high as it is shown by the model of the P/BV multiplier with realistic input parameters of expected growth and return on equity (ROE). By that measure multiplier P / BV had to be two times lower at that time. The main error of market analysts at that time was unrealistic ROE expectation.
The methodology of econometric approach to off-site monitoring of the Russian banking system is suggested. It includes econometric models of the probability of bank default, based on historical data on Russian bank defaults; models of ratings assigned to banks by rating agencies or experts, models of banks’ interest rates, and models of banks’ cost efficiency. Models are tested on real data in order to estimate possibility their potential use as part of Early Warning System in banks supervision.
Bank stabilization measures adopted by the Russian authorities since 2008 have benefited core state-owned financial institutions to a greater extent than other market participants. Public sector keeps swelling at the expense of domestic private sector. According to the author’s methodology, by January 2010 state-controlled banks possessed over 50 percent of all bank assets, thus putting Russia in the same league with China and India. Development banking and policy lending expand. A feature distinguishing Russia is gradual substitution of direct state control by indirect state ownership in the shape of corporate pyramids headed by state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks. We construct a dataset of bank-level statistical data for the period between 2001 and 2010 and find that quasi-private banks (indirectly state-owned banks) were the fastest growing subgroup. Nationalization and rehabilitation of failed banks was carried out by state-controlled banks and entities rather than by federal executive authorities directly. We suggest that the response of the Russian authorities to bank instability was consistent with long-term trends in the banking system evolution. Anti-crisis measures of 2008-9 re-aligned the sector with the traditional model of banking that rests upon dominant state-owned banks, directed lending, protectionism, administrative interference and elements of price controls. Increased government ownership of banks and control over lending activity are unlikely to be fully dismantled after the crisis is over. This scenario can nevertheless accommodate a tactical retreat of the state from non-core assets in the financial sector, leaving control over 3 largest institutions intact.
Using data on foreign borrowing, I identify Russian banks that were affected by the sudden stop of external financing caused by the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Applying the difference-in-difference method, I compare these «affected» banks to «unaffected» ones and find that the Russian Central Bank’s (CBR) anti-crisis financial assistance primarily went to the former group. Tracing the impact of the CBR’s liquidity infusions on banks’ portfolio allocation decisions, I find that banks used CBR funds not only to pay out foreign debt, but also to accumulate cash deposits in non-resident banks. I also find that affected banks increased their holdings of market securities significantly more than unaffected ones, which suggests that the CBR’s bailout policies impacted their risk-taking strategies. While there was no significant difference in corporate lending growth between the two groups after the sudden stop, lending to borrowers with weaker banking relationships (individuals and entrepreneurs) decreased more among affected banks.
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.
Smoking is a problem, bringing signifi cant social and economic costs to Russiansociety. However, ratifi cation of the World health organization Framework conventionon tobacco control makes it possible to improve Russian legislation accordingto the international standards. So, I describe some measures that should be taken bythe Russian authorities in the nearest future, and I examine their effi ciency. By studyingthe international evidence I analyze the impact of the smoke-free areas, advertisementand sponsorship bans, tax increases, etc. on the prevalence of smoking, cigaretteconsumption and some other indicators. I also investigate the obstacles confrontingthe Russian authorities when they introduce new policy measures and the public attitudetowards these measures. I conclude that there is a number of easy-to-implementanti-smoking activities that need no fi nancial resources but only a political will.
One of the most important indicators of company's success is the increase of its value. The article investigates traditional methods of company's value assessment and the evidence that the application of these methods is incorrect in the new stage of economy. So it is necessary to create a new method of valuation based on the new main sources of company's success that is its intellectual capital.