Стимулы для осуществления кооперативных специфических инвестиций: от судебных решений к теоретическому анализу
The paper investigates the interaction between the economic theory and the antitrust law. It argues that the widespread belief that theoretical analysis played a crucial role in the regulation norms evolution sometimes is not “history friendly”. The paper focuses on the regulation of vertical restraints. It contains a comparative time analysis of the key US antitrust cases concerning the vertical restraints and the new economic theories through the lens of incentives for so called “cooperative” specific investments. It shows that intention to maintain these incentives was the important factor caused the courts’ decisions, which in turn inspired the subsequent developments of economic theory. Considering the vertical restrictions as an instrument of risk sharing when the partners’ specific investments are highly asymmetric opens the new possibilities for further improvement of the regulatory framework governing the vertical agreements.