Стимулы для осуществления кооперативных специфических инвестиций: от судебных решений к теоретическому анализу
The paper investigates the interaction between the economic theory and the antitrust law. It argues that the widespread belief that theoretical analysis played a crucial role in the regulation norms evolution sometimes is not “history friendly”. The paper focuses on the regulation of vertical restraints. It contains a comparative time analysis of the key US antitrust cases concerning the vertical restraints and the new economic theories through the lens of incentives for so called “cooperative” specific investments. It shows that intention to maintain these incentives was the important factor caused the courts’ decisions, which in turn inspired the subsequent developments of economic theory. Considering the vertical restrictions as an instrument of risk sharing when the partners’ specific investments are highly asymmetric opens the new possibilities for further improvement of the regulatory framework governing the vertical agreements.
The fourth edition of this book has been entirely re-written, this time co-authored by Ioannis Lianos with the contribution of Paolo Siciliani. It includes substantially more material on the economics of competition law and integrates, for the first time, UK competition law materials and commentary. An additional new feature is greater introductory and analytical commentary, making this book suitable for use either as a stand-alone text and materials book, or as a book of materials to be used in conjunction with a second text. It will continue to be one of the best books for undergraduate and post-graduate students in competition law, providing them with the necessary critical understanding of the law, its social and economic context, and the necessary depth of analysis in order to provide them with the knowledge and tools they need for practising competition law. The materials have been completely updated to take into account recent developments in EU and UK competition law, including extracts from the leading cases of Cartes Bancaires, Intel, Lundbeck, Streetmap v Google, the most recent versions of the Block Exemption Regulations and the Europan Commission's and the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) Guidance, recent UK and other National Competition Authorities (NCA) cases in digital markets, the recent European Commission's investigations against Google (Alphabet), recent merger cases and guidance and a detailed analysis of enforcement (including private enforcement, criminal enforcement and Alternative Dispute Resolution) and procedure in both the EU and UK competition law. The book also includes commentary on the implications of Brexit in competition law enforcement in the UK. Economic analysis is presented in a non-technical way so as to enable students without any background in economics to understand the economic content of the law and to be able to critically assess economic evidence often presented in competition law cases. The book is co-authored by an economist and constitutes the only textbook/casebook in the market with a balanced incorporation of both law and economics. Other sources of wisdom for competition law, such as economic sociology and business studies, are also referred to and analyzed. The bulk of the text is made up of analysis supplemented with extracts from Commission Decisions and decisions of NCAs (in particular the UK ones), Opinions of the Advocates General at the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and judgments of the CJEU and General Court. These are supplemented by extracts from EU legislation, and comments, notes and questions prepared by the authors for each important judgment or decision so as to enhance students' understanding of the economic and legal context of the specific case.
The paper studies the specific features of trade-off between type I and type II errors in vertical restraints regulation. It pays attention to possible deviations from trade-off logic due to separate consideration of enforcement errors and some imperfections of Russian legal rules. The game theoretic model which is discussed in the second part of the article can be useful for formal analysis of externalities created by the enforcement errors.
The development of Internet retailing implies the presence of competing interests among the participants of the supply chain and requires regulation of vertical restraints. As government regulation of the vertical restraints due to their possible anticompetitive effects, then the change in the nature of competition requires a review of applicable regulations, which were adopted on June 1, 2010 in the EU. The new rules of regulation on the vertical restraints will remain in place until 2022.
Smoking is a problem, bringing signifi cant social and economic costs to Russiansociety. However, ratifi cation of the World health organization Framework conventionon tobacco control makes it possible to improve Russian legislation accordingto the international standards. So, I describe some measures that should be taken bythe Russian authorities in the nearest future, and I examine their effi ciency. By studyingthe international evidence I analyze the impact of the smoke-free areas, advertisementand sponsorship bans, tax increases, etc. on the prevalence of smoking, cigaretteconsumption and some other indicators. I also investigate the obstacles confrontingthe Russian authorities when they introduce new policy measures and the public attitudetowards these measures. I conclude that there is a number of easy-to-implementanti-smoking activities that need no fi nancial resources but only a political will.
One of the most important indicators of company's success is the increase of its value. The article investigates traditional methods of company's value assessment and the evidence that the application of these methods is incorrect in the new stage of economy. So it is necessary to create a new method of valuation based on the new main sources of company's success that is its intellectual capital.