Анализ опыта антимонопольной политики в сфере борьбы со сговором в странах переходной экономики: страны ЦВЕ
This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of CEE countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Estonia) in the creation of antitrust system was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice. The analysis takes into account such institutional problems as: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions (“per se” vs “rule of reason”), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities, especially in criminal investigation issues etc.
The article shows how the integration within the EU predetermined the development of antitrust policy in CEE countries, including the trend of the use of "rule of reason" approach. Simultaneously in the article was analyzed the experience of CEE countries in the variability of government intervention mechanisms.
In the third part of the article were shown main trends in antitrust policy transformation in CEE and common problems, that still remain actual for transition economies in this area, including the interaction problem of administrative and criminal law, rigidity of prohibitions problem and the effectiveness of leniency program design.
The analysis of competition policy during economic crisis is motivated by the fact that competition is a key factor in productivity levels. The latter, in turn, influences the scope and length of economic recession. In many Russian markets, buyers’ gains decline because of weak competition, since suppliers are reluctant to cut prices despite decreasing demand. Data on prices in Russia and abroad in the second half of 2008 show asymmetric price rigidity. At least two questions are important in an economic crisis: the “division of labor” between proactive and protective tools of competition policy and the impact of anticrisis policy on competition. Protective competition policy is insufficient in a transition economy, especially during a crisis, and it should be supplemented with well-designed industrial policy measures that do not contradict the goals of competition. The preferred tools of anticrisis policy are those that do not restrain competition.
Dr. Frédéric Jenny is the Renaissance man of competition policy. As an economist, scholar, judge and enforcer, he has helped transform the landscape of global competition enforcement. In the first volume of this Liber Amicorum, distinguished members of both Bar and Bench, as well as academics from around the world, come together to bear testimony to his international achievements. This collection of 21 articles celebrates Dr. Jenny’s career thus far, and also explores other timely and topical areas of competition law and policy.
Competition law has expanded to more than 100 jurisdictions worldwide with varying degrees of economic, social, and institutional development, raising important questions as to what is the appropriate design of competition law regimes and the interaction between competition law and economic development. This volume, comprising a selection of papers from the 4th BRICS International Competition Conference written by academic and practising economists and lawyers from both developed and developing countries, is distinctive in its focus on a broader view of competition policy in BRICS and developing countries. It examines the role competition, the application of broader public interest and national interest concerns in the analysis and influence on developing country competition authorities' policy-making. The contributors address topics such as: - a broad view of competition policy; - making markets work for the people as a post millennium development goal; - some key issues concerning the further development of China's antimonopoly law; - remedies in BRICS countries; - public interest issues in cross-border mergers; - crafting creative remedies in food markets in South Africa; - what are African competition authorities doing to fight cartels?; - successes and challenges in the fight against cartels; and the economics of antitrust sanctioning.
Beer was the drink of choice in many ancient societies and throughout the past centuries in large parts of the world. Right now, it is globally by far the most important alcoholic drink, in volume and value terms. The largest brewing companies have developed into global multinationals. The beer market is characterized by strong growth in emerging economies, by a substantial decline of (per capita) beer consumption in traditional markets, and a shift to new products. There has been a strong interaction between governments (politics) and markets (economics) in the beer industry. For centuries, taxes on beer or its raw materials were a major source of tax revenue for governments. Governments have also regulated the beer industry for reasons related to quality, health, and competition. The beer market is not only an interesting sector to study in itself but also yields important general economic insights. This book is the first economic analysis of the beer market and brewing industry. It comprises a comprehensive and unique set of economic research and analysis on the economics of beer and brewing. The various chapters cover economic history and development, demand and supply, trade and investment, geography and scale economies, technology and innovation, health and nutrition, quantity and quality, industrial organization and competition, taxation and regulation, and regional beer market developments.
Based on the analysis of actual problems of legal statistics suggestions for improving its use in the study of crime and measures of the struggles she and demonstrates ways to increase trust legal statistics and teaching effectiveness as discipline in law schools.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.