Derived from the renowned multi-volume International Encyclopaedia of Laws, this very useful analysis of constitutional law in Russia provides essential information on the country's sources of constitutional law, its form of government, and its administrative structure. Lawyers who handle transnational matters will appreciate the clarifications of particular terminology and its application. Throughout the book, the treatment emphasizes the specific points at which constitutional law affects the interpretation of legal rules and procedure.
Thorough coverage by a local expert fully describes the political system, the historical background, the role of treaties, legislation, jurisprudence, and administrative regulations. The discussion of the form and structure of government outlines its legal status, the jurisdiction and workings of the central state organs, the subdivisions of the state, its decentralized authorities, and concepts of citizenship. Special issues include the legal position of aliens, foreign relations, taxing and spending powers, emergency laws, the power of the military, and the constitutional relationship between church and state. Details are presented in such a way that readers who are unfamiliar with specific terms and concepts in varying contexts will fully grasp their meaning and significance.
Its succinct yet scholarly nature, as well as the practical quality of the information it provides, make this book a valuable time-saving tool for both practising and academic jurists. Lawyers representing parties with interests in Russia will welcome this guide, and academics and researchers will appreciate its value in the study of comparative constitutional law.
The article deals with the issues of Russian labour law compliance to the international labour standards in several crucial issues: discrimination in employment, freedom of association, wages etc.
The study dwells on the problem of interaction between North American legal doctrine and codifications of private international law in the state of Louisiana and the Province of Quebec. Covering both classical and modern USA schools of thought in the area of conflict of laws, the article also includes a comparative analysis of Book IV (Conflict of Laws) of Louisiana Civil Code and Book X (On private international law) of Quebec Civil Code respectfully. On comparing these acts, the authors dwell on a thesis that, in spite of the obvious similarities between respectful legal systems, one cannot state undoubtedly that American doctrine of private international law has been recepted by abovementioned codifications in equal measure. Therefore, despite all the similarities, the doctrinal traditions on which they are respectfully based are actually different.
In this article are discussed the limits of application of general theory of systems in legal science. The author criticizes utilization of the notion «systemacity» for description of how legal norms are organized and how legal phenomena are structured. In author’s opinion, the term «system» is charged with a multiplicity of meanings, so that in social sciences this term is sometimes applied for characterization of the fundamentally different phenomena and realities. That is why legal scientists shall be especially careful in using this term. In the Russian jurisprudence the term «system» is applied for both «social reality of law» and for a set of the norms belonging to the positive law of the country. This use is tautological and has no conceptual justification. The author proposes to use the term «legal order» only for description of a structured set of legal rules, reserving the use of «system» for characterization of law from the point of view of comparative jurisprudence, legal sociology and other sciences which examine the relations between the law and other sectors of social reality. Argumentation in favor of «systemacity» of law is theoretically based on philosophy of objectivism. It results in vain illusions about a capacity of norms to produce themselves a legal order which emerges automatically insomuch as law is a functional entity. But this «systemacity» is not given in (the) law a priori. Logical coherence and consistence of norms always remain relative, being the outcome of the purposeful activity of lawmakers, judges, legal scholars. It is naïve to suppose that rules can enter into the law and find their adequate position there without human intervention. Such understanding can lead to apology of irresponsibility of those who create redundant and inconsistent norms in the false hope that these norms will anyways find their place in the law grace to «systemacity» of this latter.