Cовместная аксиоматизция пред n-ядра и решения Дутты-Рэя для выпуклых игр

Математическая теория игр и ее приложения. 2012. Т. 4. № 2. С. 96–123.

Yanovskaya E. B.

Most of solutions for cooperative games with transferable utilities (TU) are covariant with respect to positive linear transformations of individual utilities. However, this property does not take into account interpersonal comparisons of players' payoffs. The constrained egalitarian solution defined by Dutta and Ray  for the class of convex TU games, being not covariant, served as a pretext to studying non-covariant solutions. In the paper a weakening of covariance is given in such a manner that, together with some other properties, it characterizes only two solutions -- the prenucleolus and the Dutta--Ray solution -- on the class convex TU TU games.

Keywords: Cooperative Game Theory, prenucleolus, кооперативная игра, пред n-ядро, Dutta-Ray solution, covariance, convex game, ковариантность, решение Дутта-Рэя, выпуклая игра