Ошибки I и II рода в регулировании вертикальных ограничивающих соглашений
The paper studies the specific features of trade-off between type I and type II errors in vertical restraints regulation. It pays attention to possible deviations from trade-off logic due to separate consideration of enforcement errors and some imperfections of Russian legal rules. The game theoretic model which is discussed in the second part of the article can be useful for formal analysis of externalities created by the enforcement errors.
The development of Internet retailing implies the presence of competing interests among the participants of the supply chain and requires regulation of vertical restraints. As government regulation of the vertical restraints due to their possible anticompetitive effects, then the change in the nature of competition requires a review of applicable regulations, which were adopted on June 1, 2010 in the EU. The new rules of regulation on the vertical restraints will remain in place until 2022.
The paper investigates the interaction between the economic theory and the antitrust law. It argues that the widespread belief that theoretical analysis played a crucial role in the regulation norms evolution sometimes is not “history friendly”. The paper focuses on the regulation of vertical restraints. It contains a comparative time analysis of the key US antitrust cases concerning the vertical restraints and the new economic theories through the lens of incentives for so called “cooperative” specific investments. It shows that intention to maintain these incentives was the important factor caused the courts’ decisions, which in turn inspired the subsequent developments of economic theory. Considering the vertical restrictions as an instrument of risk sharing when the partners’ specific investments are highly asymmetric opens the new possibilities for further improvement of the regulatory framework governing the vertical agreements.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.