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On compensation incentives, managerial overconfidence, and payout policy
This paper investigates how CEO overconfidence interacts with compensation structure to influence corporate payout policy. Using a panel of 713 S&P 1500 firms from 2010 to 2019, we find that overconfident CEOs with higher equity-based (i.e., convex) compensation are associated with significantly lower levels of both cash dividends and share repurchases. In contrast, inside debt compensation (non-convex) mitigates this effect, encouraging higher dividend payouts. The results uggest that these effects operate through financial slack and risk-taking channels. The uncovered relationships are present only in firms operating in non-innovative industries and with strong corporate governance. We interpret this as evidence that boards in innovative firms preserve managerial discretion, while weak governance limits the board’s ability to discipline overconfident CEOs. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of overconfidence and endogeneity controls. These results highlight the importance of tailoring CEO incentives to behavioral traits such as overconfidence, particularly in relation to payout decisions.