Трудная проблема сознания: мыслимо ли решение?
Formulated by Chalmers in 1995, the so called ‘hard problem’ inspired a new wave of interest in the philosophy of mind. And it seems to conceal a paradox. On the one hand, Chalmers with many other analytic philosophers is ready to suppose that conscience is dependent exclusively on neural activity in the brain. On the other hand, he doubts that the question ‘Why do qualia exist?’ may be fully answered in the domain of science. But may our lack of knowledge be the key? Or is a solution inconceivable in principle? In this paper an attempt was made to shed some light on this problem.
The question of the connection between the mental and the physical (body and soul), while preserving the value of one of the central problems of philosophy, intrigues not only philosophers, but also representatives of specific sciences, psychologists, physicists, logicians, semiotics with the difficulty of their consideration. In the last two centuries, new terms have appeared (“qualia”, “supervenience”, “emergence”, “philosophical zombie”), designed to help resolve the “difficult problem of consciousness” (D. Chalmers). But do these linguistic innovations provide significant progress in solving the old problem? The author believes that by updating the traditional discourse, they require substantial concrete definition, since they leave unclear the very criterion for distinguishing between “mental” and “physical” (without which the question of their correlation loses any meaning). The required criterion is described in the article as the transference (propagation “for”) non-transference (adherence to the place). “Physical” (waves, particles) retain their own properties outside the place of their origin, detecting transference (particles are transferred, waves propagate without changing their own properties); “Mental” (sensations, ideas, feelings, thoughts, emotions, aspirations, etc.) are non-transferential (they exist there and only where they originated). The difficulty of resolving the psychophysical problem is due to the “error of the beholder” - the nondiscrimination between sensible (represented) and supersensible (imaginable) elements. Mental phenomena are the result of the interaction of conceivable physical elements (following the example of wave interference and the formation of a “standing wave”). It is understood that one of the participants of the interaction ("co-producer") is the organic body of the individual (and, in particular, his brain). The hypothetical model of mental contents (metaphorical model) is an internal hologram generated by an individual and existing in a single copy. It is assumed that, having a structural character, it is capable of configuring the radiant energy of the body passing through it, thereby acting as a “formal” and “target” causes of behavior (in terms of Aristotle). Thus, the idea of the epiphenomenality (redundancy) of the psyche in the organization of the activity of an individual is challenged. The exclusive nature of mental phenomena as internal holograms is particularly emphasized, since according to the initial hypothesis they are committed to the place of their origin, they cannot be fixed with the help of technical devices or, as they say, “with the eye”, “from the outside” (they cannot be “extracted”, “Peeped”, “transferred”, “photographed”, “pinned”, etc.). It is customary to say that the mental contents are “hidden from an outside observer” and at the same time “visible (experienced) only from the inside.” The author shows that the ideas about the “appearance of mental contents from the inside” are subject to critical consideration: the idea of the “inner contemplator” gives rise to the idea of “homunculi,” the bad infinity of the “little men” nested in each other. The author's thesis is that initially “there is no one inside who would see, experience, strive,” in other words, was the subject of inner life (“I”); “Contemplated” and “contemplator” are fragments of the phenomenal field, “commented” by culturally-given verbal signs (“I see,” “I imagine,” “I feel,” etc.). Some models of “I”, generated by the corporeality of an individual in a socio-cultural environment, exhibit the property of self-movement, causa sui. Thus, in general, the relationship between the mental and the physical is interpreted as their mutual mediation, - co-beingness; relations are not symmetrical: not the psyche - “for the body”, but the body - “for the psyche”
The deep split between analytical and continental philosophy of consciousness is now observed. One can reproach the continental philosophy with rare discussions of philosophical problems of physics and neuroscience. The analytical philosophy in turn actually stopped on Kant and Aristotelean logic since Schelling and Hegel created more difficult dialectic logic. The consciousness is unnecessary for this reason in analytical tradition that leads to many paradoxes in thought experiments relate to philosophical zombie (Chalmers, hard problem of consciousness) and the Chinese room (Searle). The article is purposed to show what even quantum ontologies (last hope for many analytical philosophers) can't solve the hard problem of consciousness. Only Sartre, Berdyaev and Heidegger's existential ontologies which are inherited dialectic logic of the German philosophy can try to approach to a solution of the problem of consciousness.
In late 20th century D. Chalmers came to the conclusion that consciousness is redundant in relation to the brain functioning and he called it the hard problem of consciousness. In this article a fusion of existentialism and quantum theories of consciousness will be proposed, with the result being a neurophenomenological theory of consciousness Quantum brain and Nothingness. An important base for the paper is the idea of direct connection between the hard problem of consciousness and the problem of free will that allows us to build a “bridge” between existential philosophy and the hard problem of consciousness. The main ideas of neurophenomenological theory of consciousness will contain the following: At present moment brain can be simultaneously in multiple states, because of the significant quantum effects that influencing neuron impulses. From the third person’s perspective the quantum brain looks like physical object, but in reality (i.e. “from the inside”, “brain for brain” or brain as “thing-in-itself”) quantum brain is consciousness. It means that the conscious and quantum neuronal processes are the same “something” that can be observed both from inside and from outside. Because of that consciousness exists simultaneously in multiple states. Further free “i” in the continuously processes of selection of one of the possible state of consciousness and automatically chooses one of the possible state of the quantum brain, causing collapse of its wave function as a result. Furthermore, consciousness is “quantum brain for quantum brain” and “i” that is in the continuous process of collapsing of brain’s wave function. Quantum states of brain are pressuring “i” requiring its own realization. This “pressure” and particular quantum states of the brain are represented as multitude of qualia for “i”. As a result, consciousness is emergent interaction of “i” and quantum states of the brain.
The Eastern or Crimean War (1853–1856) phenomenon is the reflection of fundamental conflicts of the era: the clash of empires’ interests and emerging centers of capital – financial elites. The Crimean War can be referred as a protoworld war even by just considering the number of participants. The participants were not united by a common interest, but rather by a common rival. With the commencement of military actions, a common rival became a common enemy. Wars of such a scale usually occur in transitional phases of history, for example, a period of transition from political stability to political fragmentation, or vice versa. The Crimean War was related to the phase of the first type: it destroyed international political stability – the Vienna system, and opened the gate for political instability. The war had a chronocultural sense and this is one of the Crimean War’s secrets.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.