The Problem of investment Incentives and their performance in the state capitalism
The paper consists of three main sections. The first is devoted to a discussion of the "state capitalism" concept and the reasons for the growing interest to this phenomenon. It is proposed here to consider the state capitalism not only in terms of the state ownership in major national industrial enterprises and banks, but also taking into account the efficiency of SOEs. In the second section, the new data on the state involvement in the Russian economy are represented, including the shares of the state in the authorized capital of the largest industrial enterprises and banks. Their economic indicators are compared. Contrary to some assumptions P / E values for national champions are lagging behind the average for emerging markets. The third section examines the hypothesis that one of the major challenges faced by the state capitalism is the development of investment incentives for SOEs and their performance. It is shown that the interests of the state as an owner of business enterprises are often in conflict with the interests of the state as a social institution. A number of examples are demonstrated. In order to solve this problem the state should reduce its stakes in SOEs except for those that are of strategic importance. The output of the analysis is that the state capitalism as a social phenomenon has no a long-term perspective. Most of so called “state capitalist” countries will take in future the path of traditional mixed market economy.