The introduction of institutions of credit information sharing – private credit bureaus and public credit registries – in the market for bank loans represents a possible solution of the information asymmetry problem which most creditors face. However, the possibility of information sharing influences the bank’s incentives in two different ways. While it disciplines the borrowers, and therefore reduces the share of bad loans, a bank loses a competitive advantage, the monopolistic knowledge about the data in its clients’ credit histories. Does the bank have an opportunity to use the benefits of information sharing without losing its competitive advantage and its clientele? One way to do so is to report false data on borrowers. In this paper, we analyse the bank’s incentives to misreport given the bank cannot refuse to participate in the information sharing system, as membership is obligatory. Our main result is that the opportunity to get extra profit and to offer less-expensive credit to new clients explain why banks may prefer a strategy of dishonest behaviour.
This paper aims to determine what challenges Russia faces upon transitioning to a competitive system. As a main characteristic of the labour force, the motivation to work is studied in terms of three dimensions: 1) the value of current work, 2) orientation to a potential job, and 3) aspirations with respect to work. Analysis revealed the existence in Russia of homogeneous groups of workers, in terms of their motivation; this status quo is typical of both late-industrial and postindustrial societies. The author therefore argues for the complexity of ‘competitive areas’ and the simplicity of ‘noncompetitiveness’ in contemporary Russia. Meanwhile, the socioeconomic limitations to the proliferation of intrinsic and nonhygiene motivations on the one hand, and the predominance of monetary and extrinsic motivations on the other, provide evidence that one should consider Russia a country in protracted transition.
О структуре доходов и распределение прибыли в России.