В статье рассматриваются последствия реформы системы госзакупок в России в 2005-2006. Мы показываем, что до реформы промышленные предприятия с государственным участием, старые фирмы и крупные фирмы имели преимущества в доступе к госзаказам. В 2009 крупные фирмы сохранили преимущества в доступе к госзаказам. Оценки размеров «откатов» в 2009 были фактически те же, что и в 2005. Активная модернизация предприятий не влияла на доступ к государственным заказам. Мы обсуждаем причины неудачи радикальной реформы государственных закупок в России и формулируем некоторые рекомендации для политики.
This paper investigates the determinants of economic growth, while
paying special attention to the role of export and spatial externalities. We hypothesise that not industry variety per se but variety of related industries significantly contributes to economic growth in Russian regions. First, we test for the existence of spatial dependence in economic growth across Russian regions using three traditional indicators of technological progress.
Second, we construct a simple theoretical model where economic growth is exogenously determined and depends primarily on export externalities. The paper shows that export externalities have a positive and significant impact on employment growth in most sectors of the economy. Simultaneously, spatially lagged export productivity has varying effects on employment growth depending on the sector, which is decelerating economic growth in industrial sectors and accelerating economic development in the most advanced service sectors.
It is known that anticorruption measures do not significantly reduce the corruption of state employees in Russia. The goal of this research is to analyse factors that influence the level of bribery in public procurement. The investigation is based on data from two surveys. The first was conducted by the Institute for Industrial and Market Studies at the National Research University – Higher School of Economics. The second is the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey. We use binary response, ordered logit models and probit models with sample selection in this paper. Our econometric study demonstrates that incentives to bribe are higher in sectors with strong competition. Holding company members and the companies owned by the state are less involved in bribery than are private firms. The probability of bribery increases if unpredictable government regulation and political instability heavily influence enterprise performance.
The purpose of this study is to identify the spatial effects of the main macroeconomic indicators of the eastern and western regions of Russia. These regions diffr significantly in population densities and distances between cities. The main research question is the following: How do events in one of the western or eastern regions affect similar indicators in other western and eastern regions? Our analysis revealed: 1) a positive spatial correlation of the main macroeconomic indicators for the western regions, 2) both positive and negative externalities for the eastern regions and 3) a mutual but asymmetric influence of eastern and western regions. Usually "impulses" from the western regions have a positive effect on the eastern regions, but "impulses" from the eastern regions usually do not affect the western regions.
If relative deprivation matters to welfare in poor countries as much as it apparently does in rich ones then one would have to question the priority given to economic growth over redistribution in current development policies. We look for evidence in one of the world's poorest countries, Malawi. Using new survey questions that help address likely biases in past tests, we find that relative deprivation is not the dominant concern for most of our sample, although it is for the comparatively well off, including in urban areas. Our results strengthen the welfarist case for a policy focus on absolute levels of living in poor countries. The pattern of externalities suggests that there will be too much poverty and inequality from the point of view of aggregate efficiency.