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Найдено 6 публикаций
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Статья
Corazzini L., Galavotti S., Sausgruber R. et al. Experimental Economics. 2017. Vol. 20. No. 1. P. 70-99.

We experimentally study the effects of allotment—the division of an item into homogeneous units—in independent private value auctions. We compare a bundling first-price auction with two equivalent treatments where allotment is implemented: a two-unit discriminatory auction and two simultaneous single-unit first-price auctions. We find that allotment in the form of a discriminatory auction generates a loss of efficiency with respect to bundling. In the allotment treatments, we observe large and persistent bid spread, and the discriminatory auction is less efficient than simultaneous auctions. We provide a unified interpretation of our results that is based on both a non-equilibrium response to the coordination problem characterizing the simultaneous auction format and a general class of behavioral preferences that includes risk aversion, joy of winning and loser’s regret as specific cases. © 2016 Economic Science Association

Добавлено: 29 сентября 2015
Статья
Schlag K., Tremewan J., van der Weele J. Experimental Economics. 2015. Vol. 18. No. 3. P. 457-490.
Добавлено: 11 октября 2021
Статья
Irlenbusch B., Rilke R., Walkowitz G. Experimental Economics. 2019. Vol. 22. No. 2. P. 552-576.
Добавлено: 22 июля 2019
Статья
Hennig-Schmidt H., Bosman R., van Winden F. Experimental Economics. 2006. Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 35 -51.
Добавлено: 4 октября 2018
Статья
Hennig-Schmidt H., Abbink K. Experimental Economics. 2006. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 103-121.
Добавлено: 4 октября 2018
Статья
Evdokimov P., Garfagnini U. Experimental Economics. 2017. Vol. 21. P. 27-49.

We design a laboratory experiment in which an interested third party endowed with private information sends a public message to two conflicting players, who then make their choices. We find that third-party communication is not strategic. Nevertheless, a hawkish message by a third party makes hawkish behavior more likely while a dovish message makes it less likely. Moreover, how subjects respond to the message is largely unaffected by the third party’s incentives. We argue that our results are consistent with a focal point interpretation in the spirit of Schelling.

Добавлено: 27 декабря 2020