Воля как мышление или эмоция? Попытка феноменологического пересмотра

Вопросы философии. 2024. № 11. С. 17–26.

Kirsberg I. V.

The article denotes the possibility of understanding the will as a violent emotion
– rejecting ordinary phenomenological-psychological understanding of the will
as an intentional-correlative thoughtful-like structure. In the will there is no
mechanism of forming aims as a representation or an unconscious target – neither
is purposefulness nor correlativity between the aim and its direction, as
a well as mechanism for changing the will’s changes in connection with its content.
A modification of intentional-correlative structure as adapting to the will –
showing the will through filling-emptying this structure with content – is useless.
These vulnerabilities of the ordinary understanding of the will are not evident
when the will is considered in mixture with thought and deeds and in the approach
to wishes, which are also comprehended intentional-correlatively. Understanding
of the will as a causality would allow to reject these mixtures, demonstrating
the will outside the aim and its direction simply as a stream, which
provokes deeds. Thus the will could be clarified as an emotion in its heightened
excitement, independently of its content, as providing its stream in its sensual
texture, conjugations and intensity. The excitement of the will would be clear in
its homogenous character as steadfastness or reinforcement – without overfalls
and struggle in motives. This specification of the will would show its mechanism
for overcoming obstacles, its peculiarities in experiencing strength and (positive
or negative) marks, in coordination with thought and motives. The struggle against
obstacles, possibility of aims and purposefulness rise exclusively in deeds through
thought rather than in will.

Keywords: сознание, воля, мышление, consciousness, thought, will, non-cognitive, emotional stream, внекогнитивное, эмоциональный поток