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Veto Core Consistent Preference Aggregation
The proportional veto principle is the notion that a coalition of x% of the voters should be able to block roughly x% of the outcomes. This is in opposition to the majority principle, which holds that 51% of the voters should have all the decision power and the remaining 49% zero; or the utilitarian principle, which focuses selecting an outcome that is best on average, even if that outcome is inadmissible for certain individuals or groups. Originating in public choice, the proportional veto principle found rich application in the theory of social multi-criteria evaluation and bilateral choice, but to date the family of voting rules which are consistent with this principle have not been subject to the same axiomatic scrutiny as majoritarian or positional approaches to voting. In this paper we address this gap by analysing two broad families of such rules, and six concrete examples, with respect to the properties of monotonicity, participation, and independence of unanimous losers.
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