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К вопросу о причинах начала вооруженного конфликта между правительством Йеменской Республики и хуситским движением в 2004 г
This paper examines reasons which made the Yemeni Government start a large-scale military operation against the Huthis in June 2004. It is noted that this operation led to a constantly unfolding armed conflict (2004–2010) and heavily influenced both Huthi Movement and the Government. It was exactly the point from which a rapid transformation of the Huthis from a relatively small group of followers of a provincial political leader into the nation-wide force began. This military operation also marked the beginning of a series of crises which resulted in a collapse of Yemen’s statehood during the Arab Spring. Opinions of Huthis, Yemen authorities and Western researchers regarding the reasons which led to the conflict are analyzed and acknowledged either misleading or not giving a comprehensive understanding of what exactly provided an impetus to the events in question. It is demonstrated that a combination of negative political, economic, social, religious, and administrative factors created an explosive situation in Saada region (main arena of the conflict) by 2004. It is shown that during his entire rule Yemeni President Ali Saleh, when dealing with opponents, preferred limited repressions to the full-scale violence, so to order a military operation against Huthis he must have been convinced that they had real anti-government aspirations. It is also established that Yemeni high-ranked Salafi military and security commanders — members of the so-called “salafi lobby” — were deliberately misinforming Saleh regarding Huthis’ intentions and thus played a key role in the beginning of the conflict. A brief overview of this powerful group of people, which formed after the 1962 revolution with the help of the Republican authorities, is provided. It is suggested that among the reasons of the Salafis for such actions was their desire to weaken their traditional Zaydi rivals or even inflict a crushing defeat on them; distract Saleh’s and Yemeni public attention from their own strengthening during that period; and profit of the military actions and the smuggling which was flourishing in Saada.