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Restricted Domains of Dichotomous Preferences with Possibly Incomplete Information
P. 5726–5733.
Publication based on the results of:
In book
Vol. 35. Issue 6. , AAAI Press, 2021.
V. V. Karacharovskiy, Мир России: Социология, этнология 2023 Vol. 32 No. 2 P. 164–187
Despite the utopian nature of communist societies of the 20th century, the public legitimacy of temporarily sacrificing the current prosperity for the sake of a better future remains a notable characteristic of a society’s potential for modernization. The study focuses on measuring individual discount rates for reallocation of two experimental types of non-market merit goods in ...
Added: April 23, 2023
Clemens Puppe, Burka D., Szepesváry L. et al., / Series ISSN 2190-9806 "KIT Working paper in Economics". 2020. No. 145.
Voting rules can be assessed from quite different perspectives: the axiomatic, the pragmatic, in terms of computational or conceptual simplicity, susceptibility to manipulation, and many others aspects. In this paper, we take the machine learning perspective and ask how ‘well’ a few prominent voting rules can be learned by a neural network. To address this ...
Added: October 31, 2021
Kashnikov B., Вопросы философии 2021 С. 77–90
The subject matter of this article is the principle of Self-Determination of Peoples
of the contemporary international law. The principle is scrutinized both historically
through its inner historical transformation and logically, through the
analysis of its inner normative logic. The problem related to this principle is
that it belongs simultaneously to three realms, those of politics, law and morals,
containing ...
Added: October 13, 2021
Ianovski E., Kondratev A., , in: The Thirty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Technical Tracks 6Vol. 35. Issue 6.: AAAI Press, 2021. P. 5489–5496.
Added: June 3, 2021
Ianovski E., Annals of Operations Research 2022 Vol. 318 No. 2 P. 985–1000
We consider the problem of electing a committee of k candidates, subject to constraints as to which committees are admissible for constitutional, conventional, or practical reasons. In our framework, the candidates are given labels as an abstraction of a politician’s religion, a film’s genre, a song’s language, or other attribute, and the election outcome is constrained by ...
Added: May 27, 2021
Fuad Aleskerov, Karabekyan D., Ivanov A. et al., , in: Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models.: Cham: Springer, 2021. P. 231–249.
Added: April 14, 2021
Clemens Puppe, Journal of Economic Theory 2018 Vol. 176 No. C P. 55–80
It is proved that, among all restricted preference domains that guarantee consistency (i.e. transitivity) of pairwise majority voting, the single-peaked domain is the only minimally rich and connected domain that contains two completely reversed strict preference orders. It is argued that this result explains the predominant role of single-peakedness as a domain restriction in models ...
Added: May 18, 2020
Puppe C. D., Slinko A., Economic Theory 2019 Vol. 67 No. 1 P. 285–318
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders with the property that, whenever the preferences of all voters of a society belong to this set, their majority relation has no cycles. We observe that, without loss of generality, every such domain can be assumed to be closed in the sense that it contains the majority relation ...
Added: May 18, 2020
Karacharovskiy V., Shkaratan O., Социологические исследования 2020 Т. 46 № 3 С. 27–39
В статье обсуждаются результаты применения количественного подхода к оценке общественно одобряемой структуры социально значимых благ, реализованного на данных представительного опроса населения России. Основу анализа составляет задаваемая респонденту гипотетическая ситуация по справедливому распределению коллективных средств между государственными облигациями разного социального назначения, связанного с финансированием тех или иных социально значимых благ. Социальный выбор рассматривается с двух сторон ...
Added: April 23, 2020
Gladyshev M., / Series WP BRP "Basic research program". 2019. No. 70/PS/2019.
Correct aggregation of individual preferences into collective one is central problem of nowadays Social Choice theory. After the Arrow’s and Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility theorems it became clear that our desire to justify an electoral procedure is doomed to failure. At the same time a lot of scholars continued exploring different properties of existing voting rules and ...
Added: October 18, 2019
Maskin E. S., Annual Review of Economics 2019 No. 11 P. 1–26
This article reviews Kenneth Arrow's seminal work in economics, giving special emphasis to his contributions to social choice theory and general equilibrium theory. ...
Added: August 29, 2019
Ianovski E., Wilson M., Social Choice and Welfare 2019 Vol. 2 No. 52 P. 363–393
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a cornerstone of social choice theory, stating that an onto social choice function cannot be both strategy-proof and non-dictatorial if the number of alternatives is at least three. The Duggan–Schwartz theorem proves an analogue in the case of set-valued elections: if the function is onto with respect to singletons, and can ...
Added: February 25, 2019
Subochev A., Fuad Aleskerov, Pislyakov V., Journal of Informetrics 2018 Vol. 12 No. 2 P. 416–429
We use data on economic, management and political science journals to produce quan- titative estimates of (in)consistency of the evaluations based on six popular bibliometric indicators (impact factor, 5-year impact factor, immediacy index, article influence score, SNIP and SJR). We advocate a new approach to the aggregation of journal rankings. Since the rank aggregation is ...
Added: April 13, 2018
Aleskerov F. T., Pislyakov V., Subochev A., , in: Proceedings of the 21 International Conference on Science and Technology Indicators.: Valencia: Editorial Universitat Politècnica de València, 2016. Ch. 16 P. 1266–1273.
We use data on economic, management and political science journals to produce quantitative estimates of (in)consistency of evaluations based on seven popular bibliometric indicators (impact factor, 5-year impact factor, immediacy index, article influence score, h-index, SNIP and SJR). We propose a new approach to aggregating journal rankings: since rank aggregation is a multicriteria decision problem, ...
Added: October 28, 2016
Korneychuk B. V., М.: Юрайт, 2016.
Учебник соответствует Федеральному государственному образовательному стандарту высшего образования и включает изложение методологических и теоретических основ институциональной экономики, взглядов основоположников институционализма, рассмотрение институциональных методов исследования и моделирования институтов, приложение институциональной теории к анализу фирмы, рынка и государства. Особое внимание уделено игровому, трансакционному и контрактному подходам к исследованию институтов. Предназначен для студентов академического бакалавриата. ...
Added: July 6, 2016
Subochev A., В кн.: XVII Апрельская международная научная конференция по проблемам развития экономики и общества: в 4 кн.Кн. 1.: М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2017. С. 111–120.
A set of related majority rule-based social choice correspondences are considered: the union of minimal Р-dominating sets MPD (Duggan 2011, Subochev 2016) the union of weakly stable sets MWS (Aleskerov & Kurbanov 1999), the union of minimal P-externally stable sets MPES (Wuffl et al. 1989, Subochev 2008) and the union of minimal R-externally stable sets ...
Added: June 26, 2016
Subochev A., Журнал Новой экономической ассоциации 2016 № 2(30) С. 181–192
Recently, three ratings of Russian economic journals have been independently proposed by Mura-vyev (2012), Balatsky (2015) and researchers from the Higher School of Economics (2014). In this paper, quantitative estimates of their (in)consistency are obtained. Additionally, these three order-ings are compared to journal rankings based on values of Science Index and 2- and 5-year impact ...
Added: June 26, 2016
Veselova Y. A., Automation and Remote Control 2016 Vol. 77 No. 3 P. 369–388
In situations when a group of people has to make a decision based on the set of individual preferences, they use a certain aggregation method, in particular, voting. One of the main problems for any non-dictatorial social choice rule is the possibility for the voters to achieve a more preferable outcome of the voting by ...
Added: June 8, 2016
Aleskerov F. T., Ivanov A., Karabekyan D. et al., Procedia Computer Science 2015 No. 55 P. 1250–1257
Aleskerov et al. [1] and [2] estimated the degree of manipulability for the case of multi-valued choice (without using any tie-breaking rule) and for Impartial Culture (IC). In our paper, we address the similar question for the multi-valued choice and for Impartial Anonymous Culture (IAC). We use Nitzan-Kelly's (NK) index to estimate the degree of manipulability, which is calculated ...
Added: December 4, 2015