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Аксиоматики для индексов влияния в задаче голосования с квотой
С. 355–364.
Language:
Russian
Publication based on the results of:
In book
М.: Издательский дом НИУ ВШЭ, 2014.
Kondratev A., Mazalov V., International Journal of Game Theory 2020 Vol. 49 No. 1 P. 119–145
A tournament can be represented as a set of candidates and the results from pairwise comparisons of the candidates. In our setting, candidates may form coalitions. The candidates can choose to fix who wins the pairwise comparisons within their coalition. A coalition is winning if it can guarantee that a candidate from this coalition will ...
Added: May 15, 2019
Kamalova R., Полис. Политические исследования 2016 № 4 С. 147–161
В статье анализируется распределение влияния при принятии коллективных решений в Европейском парламенте в семи созывах (с 1979 по 2014 г.). Влияние участника голосования понимается как его способность повлиять на результат голосования в процессе принятия коллективных решений, зачастую оно не пропорционально доле мест, которым участник обладает. Для оценки влияния европейских политических групп используются классический индекс влияния Банцафа ...
Added: May 30, 2016
Aleskerov F. T., Andrievskaya I. K., Пермякова Е. Е., / NRU Higher School of Economics. Series FE "Financial Economics". 2014. No. WP BRP 33/FE/2014.
The issue of systemic importance has received particular attention since the recent financial crisis when it came to the fore that an individual financial institution can disturb the whole financial system. Interconnectedness is considered as one of the key drivers of systemic importance. Several measures have been proposed in the literature in order to estimate ...
Added: September 1, 2014
Shvarts D., Автоматика и телемеханика 2009 № 3 С. 152–159
In the general case, complexity of the algorithm to calculate the power indices grows exponentially with the number of voting agents. Yet the volume of calculations may be reduced dramatically if many coalitions have equal numbers of votes. The well-known algorithm for calculation of the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices was generalized, which enables fast calculation ...
Added: January 25, 2013
Shvarts D., Автоматика и телемеханика 2010 № 1 С. 144–158
We offer a general approach to describing power indices that account for preferences as suggested by F. Aleskerov. We construct two axiomatizations of these indices. Our construction generalizes the Laruelle-Valenciano axioms for Banzhaf (Penrose) and Shapley-Shubik indices. We obtain new sets of axioms for these indices, in particular, sets without the anonymity axiom. ...
Added: September 28, 2012
Batsyn M. V., Kalyagin V. A., Бизнес-информатика 2009 № 1 С. 33–40
В работе представлен алгоритм вычисления индексов влияния, имеющих вероятностное описание, при условии отсутствия предпочтений участников. Показано, что отсутствие предпочтений эквивалентно специальной структуре распределения вероятностей исходов голосования. Алгоритм основан на подходе имитационного моделирования и позволяет эффективно вычислять значения индексов при большом числе голосующих. ...
Added: September 28, 2012
Batsyn M. V., Kalyagin V. A., Автоматика и телемеханика 2011 № 3 С. 145–160
An axiomatics of power indices in voting with quota was proposed. It relies on the additivity and dictator axioms. Established was an important property that the player’s power index is representable as the sum of contributions of the coalitions in which it is a pivot member. The coalition contributions are independent of the players’ weights ...
Added: September 19, 2012
Shvarts D., Проблемы управления 2012 № 1 С. 33–41
A majority of the real voting rules are (or may be written as) voting with a quota (i.e. weighted game). But the axioms for the power indices defined on simple games are not directly transferred to the weighted games, because the operations used there are defined incorrectly in this case. Nevertheless, most of the axiomatics ...
Added: August 30, 2012