Collusion detection in procurement auctions
On December 25,2020, the second national Conference of researchers of economics, Business and society was held at the Higher School of Economics–Saint Petersburg. This event was associated with the discussion of academic and applied issues on the results and challenges that 2020 brought in various fields of science and practice: finance, economics, mathematics,education. The online conference was attended by researchers from universities in different Russian cities. Postgraduates and students from different universities, as well as practitioners from different fields of activity, contributed as co-authors. It is important that this event brought together all socially significant disciplines and became a platform for knowledge exchange, summing up the results of the year and building plans for future research. This collection contains abstracts of papers selected for participation in the conference program; selected articles are also included.
The paper discusses anti-corruption effects of public procurement reforms in Russia.
The reform of budget sector’ entities enables us to compare the impact of different types of public procurement regulations in budget and autonomous organizations in Russia. Such analysis is important in the view of critical discussion on the effects of current procurement regulation (94-FL) as well as taking into account introducing of the Federal Contract System in 2014.
Using the differences in differences methodology we consider public procurements of two national universities in 2011-2012. All procurements of the first university were regulated by the 94-FL requirements. Procurements of the second university were regulated by the 94-FL until June 2011. Later this university introduced its own Procurements Provision. Comparative analysis of procurements of these organizations enables us to estimate the impact of the different types of regulations on the efficiency of public procurement measured by the level of competition and price decline in public tenders as well as timely execution of procurement contracts.
We examine an equilibrium concept for 2-person non-cooperative games with boundedly rational agents which we call Nash-2 equilibrium. It is weaker than Nash equilibrium and equilibrium in secure strategies: a player takes into account not only current strategies but also all profitable next-stage responses of the partners to her deviation from the current profile that reduces her relevant choice set. We provide a condition for Nash-2 existence in finite games and complete characterization of Nash-2 equilibrium in strictly competitive games. Nash-2 equilibria in Hotelling price-setting game are found and interpreted in terms of tacit collusion.
Corruption in government procurements remains to be one of grave problems in transition economies. A reaction to this problem in Russia came in 2005-2006 in form of a radical reform of government procurements. This paper analyses the main parameters of firms participating in government procurements before and after changes in regulation. Our analysis is based on the data of a survey of 957 manufacturing enterprises conducted in 2009. The questionnaire included queries about participation of firms in supplies to government orders, the extent of «kickback» in public procurement system etc. A similar survey with the same sampling was conducted in 2005, and this enabled us to construct a panel of 499 firms and to have a unique opportunity for a comparison of the situation before and after the radical change in the legislation. Our regression analysis confirmed the hypotheses that in 2005, firms with government stakes, old firms (established before 1992) and larger firms had advantages in access to government orders. Our analysis of the 2009 data showed a substantial growth in the share of firms participating in government procurements. As before, large firms retain their advantages in access to government orders. However for the old firms, the corresponding coefficient became insignificant. On the other hand, firms that are located in more developed Russian regions have obtained advantages in access to government orders. Our analysis of the 2009 data also revealed that factors of active modernization of the enterprises (presence of large-scale investment projects in 2005-2008, exports, ISO certification) had no influence on access of the firms to government orders. At the same time, the fact of having fulfilled government orders in 2004 has positive influence on participation of a firm in government procurements in 2008. Estimated scales of «kickback» in 2009 were practically the same. The results of our analysis enable us to conclude that principal goals of the radical reform in 2005 were never achieved. The conclusion of our paper examines of the reason for this situation and formulates policy implications.
On the example of advocacy support of National Population Census in 2010, some specifics features of public information projects under the existing regime of public procurement are considered.
The paper discusses anti-corruption effects of public procurement reforms in Russia
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.