Институт несостоятельности в России и его реализация
Научные доклады лаборатории количественного анализа и моделирования экономики. P1. Нижегородский филиал НИУ ВШЭ, 2007. № 5.
Макаров А. С., Дремин П. Н., Шарова М. В.
Makarov A. S. In bk.: History of Accounting, Business Administration Doctrines and Development of New Methods of Management in Italy and in Russia. 1-2 October 2007, Florence. Nizhny Novgorod: 2008. P. 65-79.
The legal, methodological base and example of the modern bakruptcy analysis of a Russian company is considered under its development from the 1992 to 2007.
Added: Jul 18, 2012
Институт банкротства: неформальные правила разрешения проблемы несостоятельности на примере российской экономики
Podkolzina E. Научные доклады Института институциональных исследований. WP10. Высшая школа экономики, 2006. No. 03.
The main function of the institution of bankruptcy is to resolve problems arising from insolvency. The main goal of this paper is to study the possible approaches to resolving the insolvency problem. We define the structure of the institution of bankruptcy, which we consider to consist not only of legislation and its enforcement, but to also include informal out-of-court mechanisms and the possibility of different economic agents interpreting the same fact differently. This helps us understand the differences in how agents behave in the framework of this institution. The focus in this paper is on the mechanisms that could be used outside formal proceedings, all of which are illustrated by examples from Russian evidence. We also discuss the development of the institution of bankruptcy in Russia.
Added: Mar 15, 2013
Кирюшин С. А. В кн.: Экономика поволжья: Сборник материалов IV Всероссийской научно-технической конференции. Самара: Самарский государственный технический университет, 2005. С. 49-52.
Added: Jul 6, 2012
Кофанов Ю. Н. М.: Энергоатомиздат, 2011.
Added: Apr 18, 2012
Митрофанов С. А., Митрофанов А. С. М.: РГУИТП, 2011.
Added: Apr 17, 2012
Метод определения приоритетных направлений развития стратегических альянсов в инновационном процессе по составляющим системы сбалансированных показателей
Александровский С. В. В кн.: Региональные перспективы развития инновационной экономики России: сборник статей по материалам международной научно-практической конференции. Н. Новгород: ООО "Стимул-СТ", 2011. С. 11-22.
Added: Jun 29, 2012
Особенности прекращения поручительства судом в соответствии с пунктом 1 статьи 367 Гражданского кодекса Российской Федерации
Позднякова Е. А. Вестник Оренбургского государственного университета. 2010. Т. 3. С. 142-146.
Added: Apr 16, 2012
Александровский С. В., Бутрюмова Н. Н., Назаров М. Г. Финансовая аналитика: проблемы и решения. 2011. № 46. С. 21-33.
Added: Jun 30, 2012
Menyashev R., Natkhov T. V., Яновский К. Э. Economics/EC. WP BRP. Высшая школа экономики, 2013. No. WP BRP 47/EC/2013 .
The ratings of political institutions are well-known and widely used in academic literature. These ratings are mostly based on expert evaluations. However, such evaluations can be subjective and occasionally driven by ideological considerations. In this paper we propose two new indicators of institutional quality for 154 countries. These indicators are constructed in a way that minimizes the subjectivity of the evaluations. Only the presence or absence of a particular institutional phenomenon is identified. This puts much less weight on possible bias and makes easy to verify. We show that these indices predict economic growth better than those commonly used, primarily because they include information about institutions that has been accumulated over a period of approximately two centuries.
Added: Jan 17, 2014
Sprenger C. Исследования по экономике и финансам. WP9. Высшая школа экономики, 2013
This study investigates an important aspect of the long-run evolution of firms that have been founded in Russia under the Soviet planning system, namely their survival under rapidly changing conditions. In our analysis, we focus on the questions whether initial conditions, in particular privatization and the choice among various privatization options, have affected the likelihood of survival. We use a sample of 497 privatized and non-privatized firms that have been surveyed in 1999-2000 and for which we updated the information about the survival status, reasons for exit including bankruptcy procedures and their ownership structure (state-owned vs. private). We find that privatization and the choice of privatization option have no effect on the long-term survival of firms in Russia. This is in line with earlier results by Brown et al. (2011) that any positive productivity effects of privatization in Russia take much time to realize. But it is neither the case that privatization has considerably accelerated the process of creative destruction, which often takes the form of liquidation of existing firms.
Added: May 16, 2013
Зинченко В. П. Культурно-историческая психология. 2012. № 1. С. 59-68.
Added: Jun 30, 2012
Кофанов Ю. Н. М.: АНО «Академия надёжности», 2010.
Added: Apr 18, 2012
Экономика и управление: проблемы и перспективы развития. Сборник научных статей по итогам международной научно-практической конференции г.Волгоград 15-16 ноября 2010 г.
Ч. 1. Волгоград: Волгоградское научное издательство, 2010.
Added: Jan 18, 2013
Anisimova A. I., Muradyan P. A., Vernikov A. V. SSRN Working Paper Series. Social Science Research Network, 2011. No. 1919817.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker et al. (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market, and the results from non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan. Going further away from aggregated analysis we compute Lerner indices in two product segments of Tatarstan – retail and corporate loans – and find that retail segment is significantly more competitive. Local banks exert more market power in corporate loans, while federal branches – in retail loans.
Added: May 14, 2012
Added: Feb 22, 2013
Трунин П. В., Дробышевский С. М., Евдокимова Т. В. М.: Издательский дом «Дело» РАНХиГС, 2012.
Added: Mar 26, 2013
Яковлев А. А. Общественные науки и современность. 2008. № 4. С. 21-37.
Added: Sep 22, 2012
Penikas H. I. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 03.
The Basel Committee of Banking Supervision initiated a discussion on the most efficient practices to prevent bank managers from excessive risk-taking. This paper proposes a game-theoretical approach, describing the decision-making process by a bank manager who chooses his own level of risk and effort. If the level of risk implies the variability of the future outcome, the amount of effort applied affects the probability of a positive outcome. Although effort is unobserved for the bank’s stakeholders, the risk level is under control, and is associated with certain indicators such as capital adequacy ratio or leverage level. The risk-neutral utility function of a bank manager and a binary game outcome of gaining profit or loss for a bank are assumed. Starting from the general incentive contract scheme having the fixed and variable parts of remuneration, it is proposed that differentiating the variable part of remuneration is sufficient to motivate bank managers to make fewer risky decisions. More precisely, the variable part of remuneration (e.g. the share of the bank’s profit) needs to be higher in proportion to the higher variance of outcome for the high -risk outcome case to stimulate a bank manager to opt for lower-risk decisions in place of higher-risk situations.
Added: May 3, 2012
Уринсон Я. М. Вестник Европы. 2014. № 38-39.
Added: Feb 5, 2018
Penikas H. I., Titova Y. Financial Economics. FE. Высшая школа экономики, 2012. No. 02.
In this paper we elaborate a simple model that allows for the predicting of possible reactions from financial institutions to more stringent regulatory measures introduced by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in regard to global systemically important banks (G-SIBs). The context is framed by a 2011 BCBS document that proposes higher capital requirements for global systemically important banks. We attempt to analyze bank interactions in an oligopolistic market that is subject to demand constraints on loan amounts and additional loss absorbency requirements introduced by the regulator. We distinguish between the bank’s announced funding cost that determines both the loan amount issued and the market interest rate, and the bank’s true funding cost that has a direct impact on retained earnings. We conclude that in a two-stage game both banks will announce the highest funding cost, thus reducing the amount of loans granted (in line with the regulator’s objective), but at the expense of a higher cost of borrowing established in the market. If the game is repeated, then both banks also choose lower loan amounts in the periods prior to the last one in which the declared funding cost is the lowest possible. It should be noted that the designated outcome also coincides with the findings of the Monetary Economic Department of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
Added: May 3, 2012
Карпов А. В., Вольский В. И. Полития: Анализ. Хроника. Прогноз. 2011. № 2. С. 162-174.
Added: Jun 24, 2011