An Optimal Incentive Contract Preventing Excessive Risk-Taking by a Bank Manager
The paper analyses how the individuals' deposits influences the resources of Russian banks. We show that the depositors panic in the crisis has a serious effect on stability of both bank and national bank system. We show the tendencies how the volume and structure of individuals' deposits change; how to avoid the rash of withdrawals by individual depositors; and how the resources of Russian banks shrank because of such withdrawals happened in the period of the crisis. We also present our assessment of how the resources of Russian banks reduced because of the rash of withdrawals in the crisis.
The book is devoted to problems of legislative, theoretical and judicial defining of subject of economic crimes in Russian and German criminal law in connection with legal persons. The authors analyze the current theoretical conceptions and case law and formulate proposals for improvement of present approaches. The special attention is given to liability of competitive manager for crimes committed in course of bankruptcy.
The author of article E.P.Gavrilov, professor of the chair of the civil law of the Higher school of economy, doctor of law answers to the questions of readers of the magazine, received in connection with his previously published article.
The Working Paper examines the peculiarities of the Russian model of corporate governance and control in the banking sector. The study relies upon theoretical as well as applied research of corporate governance in Russian commercial banks featuring different forms of ownership. We focus on real interests of all stakeholders, namely bank and stock market regulators, bank owners, investors, top managers and other insiders. The Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance. We suggest some ways of overcoming the gap between formal institutions of governance and the real life.
This book is a comprehensive tutorial for labor motivation management. Сourse on motivation and remuneration is mandatory Human Resource Management bachelor and master programs. Motivation and remuneration is also a part of human resources management course, which is a mandatory part for any managerial education program. This book is intended not only for students but also for a wide range of readers. It is written for practicing managers, management consultants, university and MBA programs professors. The main idea of this book is to connect a hands-on experience in implementing described models with a scientific base.
The book is published by the Italian-German Research Center on the basis of the International Scientific Conference «Imperium, state, civitas. Critical contribution to the concept of power in the postmodern era ", held in Villa Vigone (Italy) 19-21 March 2013. The book is a collection of the articles of Italian, German, Russian and Chinese professors of jurisprudence.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market. Non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan.
This paper aims at explaining the differences in valuation of banking firms in Russia through the impact of selected elements of corporate governance. We rely upon value-based management theory to test the hypothesis that expenses on corporate governance system create shareholder value. The price at which share stakes are acquired by strategic foreign investors is for us a criterion of market-proven value, so we use the standard valuation tool, i.e. price-to-book-value of equity (P/BV) multiple, as the dependent variable. The set of corporate governance parameters whose materiality for a would-be external investor we would like to test includes: the degree of concentration of ownership and control; maturity of corporate governing bodies; degree of Board independence; qualification of external auditors; stability of governing bodies (Management Board and Board of Directors); and availability of external credit ratings from the world’s leading rating agencies. We test our approach on a sample of acquisition deals and public offerings over the period 2004-2008 that we develop for the first time. Firstly, we find out which factors are statistically significant and relevant to a bank’s selling price. Secondly, a least squares multiple linear regression model is devised to check how each individual variable impacts the dependent variable. We discover that external investors attach value to high concentration of ownership, external credit rating coverage, stability of the Board of Directors, and involvement of well-established external auditors. Investors of a strategic nature tend to pay a higher acquisition premium. Independence of the Board of Directors might be perceived by external strategic investors as a disadvantage and might destroy shareholder value.
Using data on foreign borrowing, I identify Russian banks that were affected by the sudden stop of external financing caused by the Lehman Brothers’ collapse. Applying the difference-in-difference method, I compare these «affected» banks to «unaffected» ones and find that the Russian Central Bank’s (CBR) anti-crisis financial assistance primarily went to the former group. Tracing the impact of the CBR’s liquidity infusions on banks’ portfolio allocation decisions, I find that banks used CBR funds not only to pay out foreign debt, but also to accumulate cash deposits in non-resident banks. I also find that affected banks increased their holdings of market securities significantly more than unaffected ones, which suggests that the CBR’s bailout policies impacted their risk-taking strategies. While there was no significant difference in corporate lending growth between the two groups after the sudden stop, lending to borrowers with weaker banking relationships (individuals and entrepreneurs) decreased more among affected banks.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.
In this paper we investigate how asymmetric information and informed trading influences liquidity and how liquidity influences asset pricing on the Russian stock market in 1998-2011. We use a battery of existing liquidity proxies as well as our own modification of Lesmond et al. (1999) measure and capture informed trading through positive daily return autocorrelation. We find that asymmetric information worsens liquidity, whereas no supportive evidence of adverse impact of informed trading can be discovered, which could be partly due to a weak proxy. Furthermore, liquidity, along with market risk, seems to be the major driver of asset pricing on the Russian stock market. This result, however, is not robust to specifying liquidity as characteristic rather than factor.