Working paper
FinTech Regulation Subject to Human Psychology
Соглашения Базель II и III позволяют банкам использовать собственную статистику дефолтов для оценки параметров регулирования (риск-весов) в нормативе достаточности капитала. Банк вносит собственные оценки параметров в модель Васичека. На выходе получается распределение кредитных потерь. Регулятор требует взять 99.9%-ный квантиль такого распределения как меру риска (риск-вес). Говоря регулятор, мы имеем в виду любой Центральный Банк, который разрешает использовать данный подход внутренних рейтингов (ПВР). Это относится и к Банку России, но не ограничено им. Хотя ПВР критикуют как избыточно консервативную оценку риска, в работе приведено доказательство обратного. А именно то, когда ПВР недооценивает кредитный риск. Это следствие обнаруженного факта связи корреляции дефолтов и реализаций системного фактора. Последним может быть рассмотрен темп роста ВВП для примера. Такая связь не заложена в модели Васичека. Для обоснования найденного использована статистика по кредитам США с 1984 по 2019 гг. Для с учетом 100%-ной корреляции активов в модели Васичека показано, что кредитный риск недооценивается на 11%, как минимум.
Monograph by S. Khasyanova «Upgrading Banking Regulation and Supervision in Russia in the line with International Standards» is devoted to the study of the development of banking regulation and supervision in Russia on the basis of international principles and standards. The process of implementation of international principles and standards of banking regulation in the Russian Federation and the following consequences are analyzed in the context of financial stability. Particular attention is paid to macroeconomic regulation and development of prudential regulations and requirements for banks, taking into account banking sector peculiarities. The regulation of systemic risk, identification of systemically important banks and applied to them a particular regulatory regime were investigated. The Deposit Insurance System and its role in enhancing the stability of banks as well as its directions of improvement are also considered in the study. The book is intended for professionals in the field of finance and banking, teachers and students of universities’ economic and financial departments.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.