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Working paper

Games with incomplete information on one side as games with incomplete information on both sides and asymmetric computational resources

Kreps V. L., Gavrilovich M.
Supposing that Player~1's computational power is higher than  that of Player~2,  we give three  examples of different kinds of public signal about the state of a two-person zero-sum game with symmetric incomplete information on both sides (both players do not know the state of the game)  where  Player~1 due to his computational power learns the state of the game meanwhile it is impossible for Player~2. That is, the game with incomplete information on both sides becomes a game with incomplete information on the side of Player~2. Thus we demonstrate that  information  about the state of a game may appear not only due to a private signal but as a  result of a public signal and asymmetric computational resources of players.