Trois paralogismes épistémiques, une logique des énonciations
Hugh MacColl is commonly seen as a pioneer of modal and many-valued logic, given his introduction of modalities that go beyond plain truth and falsehood. But a closer examination shows that such a legacy is debatable and should take into account the way in which these modalities proceeded. We argue that, while MacColl devised a modal logic in the broad sense of the word, he did not give rise to a many-valued logic in the strict sense. Rather, his logic is similar to a “non-Fregean logic”: an algebraic logic that partitions the semantic classes of truth and falsehood into subclasses but does not extend the range of truth-values.
An arithmetic theory of oppositions is devised by comparing expressions, Boolean bitstrings, and integers. This leads to a set of correspondences between three domains of investigation, namely: logic, geometry, and arithmetic. The structural properties of each area are investigated in turn, before justifying the procedure as a whole. To finish, I show how this helps to improve the logical calculus of oppositions, through the consideration of corresponding operations between integers.
H. Slater famously argued that there are no paraconsistent logics, inasmuch as paraconsistent negation is not a proper negation. Such a vivid attack has been variously replied, including an appropriate reply by J.Y. Beziau, where the author resorted to the same conceptual framework as Slater’s argument: the theory of opposition. Slater argues that, in order to overcome the view that everything follows from an inconsistent set of premises, some paraconsistentists unjustifiably neglect a crucial property of logical negation: to ban contradictions. The point is to shed new light upon the concepts Slater used in his argument to depict paraconsistency.
The article considers the Views of L. N. Tolstoy not only as a representative, but also as a accomplisher of the Enlightenment. A comparison of his philosophy with the ideas of Spinoza and Diderot made it possible to clarify some aspects of the transition to the unique Tolstoy’s religious and philosophical doctrine. The comparison of General and specific features of the three philosophers was subjected to a special analysis. Special attention is paid to the way of thinking, the relation to science and the specifics of the worldview by Tolstoy and Diderot. An important aspect is researched the contradiction between the way of thinking and the way of life of the three philosophers.
Tolstoy's transition from rational perception of life to its religious and existential bases is shown. Tolstoy gradually moves away from the idea of a natural man to the idea of a man, who living the commandments of Christ. Starting from the educational worldview, Tolstoy ended by creation of religious and philosophical doctrine, which were relevant for the 20th century.
This important new book offers the first full-length interpretation of the thought of Martin Heidegger with respect to irony. In a radical reading of Heidegger's major works (from Being and Time through the ‘Rector's Address' and the ‘Letter on Humanism' to ‘The Origin of the Work of Art' and the Spiegel interview), Andrew Haas does not claim that Heidegger is simply being ironic. Rather he argues that Heidegger's writings make such an interpretation possible - perhaps even necessary.
Heidegger begins Being and Time with a quote from Plato, a thinker famous for his insistence upon Socratic irony. The Irony of Heidegger takes seriously the apparently curious decision to introduce the threat of irony even as philosophy begins in earnest to raise the question of the meaning of being. Through a detailed and thorough reading of Heidegger's major texts and the fundamental questions they raise, Haas reveals that one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century can be read with as much irony as earnestness. The Irony of Heidegger attempts to show that the essence of this irony lies in uncertainty, and that the entire project of onto-heno-chrono-phenomenology, therefore needs to be called into question.
The article is concerned with the notions of technology in essays of Ernst and Friedrich Georg Jünger. The special problem of the connection between technology and freedom is discussed in the broader context of the criticism of culture and technocracy discussion in the German intellectual history of the first half of the 20th century.