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Working paper

Trois paralogismes épistémiques, une logique des énonciations

Construction (Festschrift for Gerhard Heinzmann). ISBN 978-1-84890-016-5. College Publications, 2010
Assuming that a paralogism is an unintentionally invalid reasoning, we give an exemplification by means of three epistemic "paradoxes", namely: Fitch's Paradox, Moore's Paradox, and Zemach's Paradox. A common symptom lies on the basis of these three paralogisms, which concerns the satisfaction-conditions of a discourse about truth. From an anti-realist understanding of these paradoxes, we propose an alternative semantic framework in which the meaning of sentences relies upon a question-answer game. Then we set forth some features of this many-valued framework, before applying it to the three preceding paradoxes and displaying its general prospect.