Из истории институциализации экономической науки: «ленинградское дело»
This book explores the application of field theory (patterns of interaction) to Russian economic history, and how social and political fields mediate the influences of institutions, structures, discourses and ideologies in the creation and dissemination of economic thinking, theory and practice. Using focused cases on Russia's economy from the mid-nineteenth century to the present, Hass and co-authors expand the empirical basis of field studies to provide new material on Russian economic history. The cases are divided into two complementary halves: i) The role of fields of institutions, discourses, and structures in the development of Russian economic thought, especially economic theories and discourses; and ii) The role of fields in the real adoption and implementation of policies in Soviet and Russian economic history.
With developed discussion of fields and field theory, this book moves beyond sociology to demonstrate to other disciplines the relation of fields and field theory to other frameworks and methodological considerations for field analysis, as well as providing new empirical insights and narratives not as well-known abroad.
The article focuses on the limits of using oral history methods in the research of academic communities. The authors analyze the language and ways of self-description used by modern Russian academic community. The study is based on the interviews of Post-Soviet university professors, which helps to clarify what is the concept of tradition for them, what is the origin of their individual memories, and how these memories correspond to the collective perceptions of the ideal university.
In this paper the author argues that we can identify three types of intellectual communities that participate actively in the policy process: analytical communities, experts’ communities and communities of consultants. The distinguishing features of these communities are both an analytical tool and a manifestation of their different identities. These policy actors are distinguished from each other by several criteria: the focus of their political activity (policy analysis, expert reports / remarks or political advise / PR); referent groups (academic, professional or business communities); principles of interaction with decision makers (self-autonomy, contract, clientelism); ethical principles, civic values and attitudes. According to the author’s empirical research of analytical centers and communities in Moscow1 and Russian regions (Karelia, Tatarstan and Saratov region)2 we can make the conclusion that the identity of analytical communities can take three forms: analytical structures (think tanks, public policy centers etc.); “analytical spaces” (recurrent seminars, club meetings, forums etc.), informal intellectual groups. The empirical research that was conducted by the author and the Committee on Public Policy and Governance of the Russian Association for Political Science allows us to point out several factors that influence the identity of analytical communities and their capacity to be autonomous and powerful policy actors and to put these factors into hierarchical order according to their importance for development of analytical communities. The first group of factors is infrastructure for analytical communities; actors with strategic vision i.e. leaders that have organizational, communicational, project work capitals and skills in analytical communities; Human recourses and its mobility (“revolving door system”, academic and scientific traditions, quantity and quality of intellectuals and researchers, etc.). These three factors are vital and the most important for the emergence of analytical community’s identity. Another group of factors: the level of political competition and pluralism (political actors, their goals, diversity of strategies, the strength of political opposition etc.); institutionalization level of the political processes (efficiency of democratic institution and decision making procedures etc.); the capacity of analytical communities to build coalitions with other political actors and social groups (with interest groups, business associations, political parties, civil society organizations, local authorities). These three factors are vital and the most important for the development of analytical communities as influential and autonomous political actors. For Eastern European countries, where political competition and pluralism are not widespread and civil society institutions are week, the capacity of analytical communities to build coalitions with other political actors and social groups is the most promising strategy for democratic development. Additional factor to this group is inclusiveness and transparency of policy process. It correlates with capacity to build coalitions factor. Legal prerequisites (liberal NGO regulation etc.) and philanthropy recourses (from the development of philanthropic culture to the amount of philanthropists) are the cultural factors which depend on long-term features of the civilization or a group of states with similar historical paths. According to the theory of political science and policy practice, in political process we can identify two types of political activities. Activities of the first type are connected with state strategy and program implementation, decision making practices, political management, and problem-solving. The second type of activities are related to the analysis of challenges which decision makers face, with developing programs and strategies of addressing social, economic and political issues. The first type of activities or functions are delegated to politicians (decision makers, political elites etc.) the second ones are related to the work of the intellectuals (analysts, experts, consultants etc.). The demand for the intellectual support of policy implementation is high and even growing in modern diverse and dynamic societies. We can say that this function in contemporary political systems is carried out by intellectual communities.
The chapter traces the history and reconstructs the logic of ownership debates in Soviet economic thought. Despite crucial role that ownership received in the Soviet economic literature, this concept predominantly was conceived legally thus making economic discourse inconsistent and dogmatic. Attempts to overcome this inconsistency by the leading schools of Soviet economic thought are considered and related to the broder contexts of ideological, political and economic discourses.
This chapter takes us to another case of institutional and field turmoil: high Stalinism after World War II. The Blockade of Leningrad had claimed more than one million victims and disrupted the work of economists, especially those at Leningrad State University. Adjusting to post-war life was its own challenge, but by 1948, the Leningrad Affair heralded a new wave of Stalinist repression aimed at Leningrad elites who led the city through the wartime Blockade. Part of this dynamic took place in public “discussions” as a tool to discipline economists and professors to make sure their “science” did not challenge the authority of elite or ideology. The threat to power, it seemed, was local-level fields: a profession grounded in the search for Truth and intimately linked to Marxism-Leninism, an institution (the university), and “science” as practice and identity that was supposed to transcend social reality. High Stalinism was not only a matter of a suspicious elite rooting out competition; it had a complex dynamic that ran through combinations of institutions that, in this case, came together in the university.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.