Product Diversity in a Vertical Distribution Channel under Monopolistic Competition
Some countries treat public-private partnerships (PPP) within public procurement legislation, whilst others adopt a specially designed PPP law to distinguish PPPs from the routine purchases of goods and services. There is no evidence to suggest which of the approaches is more efficient. Differences are visible even for highly developed economies such as the UK (no special PPP law, rather policy guidance) and the US (special PPP laws adopted in over 30 States, counting.) Does it make sense to have a special PPP legislation? If yes, what should such legislation govern? The last question seems tautological as “a PPP legislation should govern public-private partnerships”, yet we claim that in order to promote economic efficiency, the law should focus on the environment that surrounds public-private relationships. We develop a model of PPP based on the system of standard contractual agreements between the government and the private sector, like the typical contracts used in public procurement. Due to the asymmetric information, some socially desirable projects are too costly to run within a standard procurement contract, this is where partnerships should help. Specific features that are needed to make those costly projects feasible, include a reduction in the information costs through a closer monitoring within the co-production, a reduction in the production costs through a lesser red tape, and extra benefits (distinct from subsidies and monetary rewards) to the private partner, arising from the cooperation with the state (e.g. reputational gains, access to new resources, etc.) In an institutional/cultural environment with [most of] these features in force, a special PPP legislation is not needed (UK and Australia are prominent examples), as there is no scope for a further reduction of the number of infeasible (costly) projects. Otherwise, a PPP law that offers the above features (e.g. by creating a dedicated PPP advisory unit) is socially desirable.
In this paper, we consider the following problem - what affects the amount of investment in knowledge when one of the network firms enters another innovation network. The solution of this problem will allow us to understand exactly how innovative companies will behave when deciding whether to enter the innovation network of another country or region, what conditions affect it and how the level of future investments in knowledge can be predicted.
The paper proposes a list of requirements for a game able to describe individually motivated social interactions: be non-cooperative, able to construct multiple coalitions in an equilibrium and incorporate intra and inter coalition externalities. For this purpose the paper presents a family of non-cooperative games for coalition structure construction with an equilibrium existence theorem for a game in the family. Few examples illustrate the approach. One of the results is that efficiency is not equivalent to cooperation as an allocation in one coalition. Further papers will demonstrate other applications of the approach.
In this paper we consider games with preference relations. The main optimality concept for such games is concept of equilibrium. We introduce a notion of homomorphism for games with preference relations and study a problem concerning connections between equilibrium points of games which are in a homomorphic relation. The main result is finding covariantly and contravariantly complete families of homomorphisms.
This chapter addresses the relationship between class, family and social welfare policies by analysing the construction of the identity category of ‘unfortunate families’ (neblagopoluchnye sem’i) in popular scientific discourses, governmental policy documents and discourses of social services, and by examining how those labelled as ‘unfortunate’ negotiate this identity conferred to them. The chapter shows that gender and class are closely intertwined in the production of this identity, as it is single mothers who are primarily categorised as ‘unfortunate’. In our analysis we draw on multiple sources of data. First, we analyse in-depth and focus group interviews with service providers and clients and participant observation data from a number of Russian cities. Second, we analyse various government documents and social advertisements, mass media materials, social policy and social work textbooks, and popular scientific texts published during the 1990–2010s. This chapter begins with a review of Western theoretical discussions of class in the context of family and welfare in order to see how Russia fits into these debates. Western class analysis was considered irrelevant in the Soviet Union due to the supposedly classless nature of advanced socialism, but the transition to a market economy in the 1990s and the new kind of class society it engendered have made these discussions topical in Russia. In the second section of this chapter we offer a brief description of the main principles of the Soviet and post-Soviet welfare ideologies and the policies towards families. The following sections examine how popular scientific discourses, governmental policy documents and social advertisements, and social service providers construct class with the concept of the unfortunate family. The last section preceding the conclusions analyses how mothers labelled as unfortunate negotiate this stigmatised identity.
The ninth issue of annual Collection of articles consists of four sections: “Analysis of actual economic processes”, “Modeling of financial and market mechanisms”, “Dynamic models”, “Discussions, Notes and Letters”. As a whole nine articles are presented
For n person games with preference relations some types of optimality solutions are introduced. Elementary properties of their solutions are considered. One sufficient condition for nonempty Ca-core is found.
The paper examines the structure, governance, and balance sheets of state-controlled banks in Russia, which accounted for over 55 percent of the total assets in the country's banking system in early 2012. The author offers a credible estimate of the size of the country's state banking sector by including banks that are indirectly owned by public organizations. Contrary to some predictions based on the theoretical literature on economic transition, he explains the relatively high profitability and efficiency of Russian state-controlled banks by pointing to their competitive position in such functions as acquisition and disposal of assets on behalf of the government. Also suggested in the paper is a different way of looking at market concentration in Russia (by consolidating the market shares of core state-controlled banks), which produces a picture of a more concentrated market than officially reported. Lastly, one of the author's interesting conclusions is that China provides a better benchmark than the formerly centrally planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe by which to assess the viability of state ownership of banks in Russia and to evaluate the country's banking sector.
The paper examines the principles for the supervision of financial conglomerates proposed by BCBS in the consultative document published in December 2011. Moreover, the article proposes a number of suggestions worked out by the authors within the HSE research team.