Market Discipline and the Russian Interbank Market
We aim to discover the relationship between market discipline and banking system transparency using the cross-country data (1990-2003) with Nier index and index based on World Bank surveys' data. We show that measures aimed to increase transparency, not being accompanied with requirements related to information availability and/or interpretability, may be not efficient in reaching the goal of market discipline stimulation.
Bank stabilization measures adopted by the Russian authorities since 2008 have benefited core state-owned financial institutions to a greater extent than other market participants. Public sector keeps swelling at the expense of domestic private sector. According to the author’s methodology, by January 2010 state-controlled banks possessed over 50 percent of all bank assets, thus putting Russia in the same league with China and India. Development banking and policy lending expand. A feature distinguishing Russia is gradual substitution of direct state control by indirect state ownership in the shape of corporate pyramids headed by state-owned enterprises and state-owned banks. We construct a dataset of bank-level statistical data for the period between 2001 and 2010 and find that quasi-private banks (indirectly state-owned banks) were the fastest growing subgroup. Nationalization and rehabilitation of failed banks was carried out by state-controlled banks and entities rather than by federal executive authorities directly. We suggest that the response of the Russian authorities to bank instability was consistent with long-term trends in the banking system evolution. Anti-crisis measures of 2008-9 re-aligned the sector with the traditional model of banking that rests upon dominant state-owned banks, directed lending, protectionism, administrative interference and elements of price controls. Increased government ownership of banks and control over lending activity are unlikely to be fully dismantled after the crisis is over. This scenario can nevertheless accommodate a tactical retreat of the state from non-core assets in the financial sector, leaving control over 3 largest institutions intact.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. We distinguish between banks that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
The paper examines corporate governance and control in Russian banks. We focus on real interests of stakeholders – bank regulators, owners, investors, and top managers. Anglo-American concept of corporate governance, based on agency theory and implying outside investors’ control over banks through stock market, is found to bear limited relevance.
The process of the IPO of banks in Russia is its infancy but the rapid growth is forecasted. This context raises the issue of the factors determining the floated banks stock value. The results of the research on 2007-2009 Russian data showed that the bank stock price is dependent on the macroeconomic indicators (such as the oil prices and the Dow Jones index volatility) and the some banking system indicators(the interbank interest rate, the bank’s ROA, and ROE). However, the results adjusted to the global financial crisis effect proved to exclude the ROE factor and showed the dependence of the stocks prices of the floated banks from the historic trend of the American economy. The models developed are of the practical application and can be used by the institutional as well as the private investors.
The purpose of this paper is to carefully assess the size of public sector within the Russian banking industry. We identify and classify at least 78 state-influenced banks. For the state-owned banks, we distinguish between those that are majority-owned by federal executive authorities or Central Bank of Russia, by sub-federal (regional and municipal) authorities, by state-owned enterprises and banks, and by "state corporations". We estimate their combined market share to have reached 56% of total assets by July 1, 2009. Banks indirectly owned by public capital are the fastest-growing group. Concentration is increasing within the public sector of the industry, with the top five state-controlled banking groups in possession of over 49% of assets. We observe a crowding out and erosion of domestic private capital, whose market share is shrinking from year to year. Several of the largest state-owned banks now constitute a de facto intermediate tier at the core of the banking system. We argue that the direction of ownership change in Russian banking is different from that in CEE countries.
In this paper, we model the deposit market with costly information on bank risks. The model adds to the volume of literature related to the Diamond Dybvig mod el and related models of information based bank runs. The inclusion of costly information signals indicates that depositors must decide whether to pay for information regarding changes in the riskiness of banking activities; these costs may involve, for instance, time and other resources needed to find and read financial information. We show that an efficient bank run is the only equilibrium even in case of non negative information costs. To ensure the uniqueness of the efficient bank run equilibrium it is enough to lower the costs for at least one group of the depositors or introduce the deposit insurance system with co insurance.
This paper uses the banking industry case to show that the boundaries of public property in Russia are blurred. A messy state withdrawal in 1990s left publicly funded assets beyond direct reach of official state bodies. While we identify no less than 50 state-owned banks in a broad sense, the federal government and regional authorities directly control just 4 and 12 institutions, respectively. 31 banks are indirectly state-owned, and their combined share of state-owned banks’ total assets grew from 11% to over a quarter between 2001 and 2010. The state continues to bear financial responsibility for indirectly owned banks, while it does not benefit properly from their activity through dividends nor capitalization nor policy lending. Such banks tend to act as quasi private institutions with weak corporate governance. Influential insiders (top-managers, current and former civil servants) and cronies extract their rent from control over financial flows and occasional appropriation of parts of bank equity.
The article dealsthe following questions to answer: • Do any mechanisms of market discipline exist in Russian market for personal deposits? We analyze the quantitative mechanisms: disciplining by quantity and by maturity shifts. • Did the DIS introduction influence depositors’ investment strategies?
Smoking is a problem, bringing signifi cant social and economic costs to Russiansociety. However, ratifi cation of the World health organization Framework conventionon tobacco control makes it possible to improve Russian legislation accordingto the international standards. So, I describe some measures that should be taken bythe Russian authorities in the nearest future, and I examine their effi ciency. By studyingthe international evidence I analyze the impact of the smoke-free areas, advertisementand sponsorship bans, tax increases, etc. on the prevalence of smoking, cigaretteconsumption and some other indicators. I also investigate the obstacles confrontingthe Russian authorities when they introduce new policy measures and the public attitudetowards these measures. I conclude that there is a number of easy-to-implementanti-smoking activities that need no fi nancial resources but only a political will.
One of the most important indicators of company's success is the increase of its value. The article investigates traditional methods of company's value assessment and the evidence that the application of these methods is incorrect in the new stage of economy. So it is necessary to create a new method of valuation based on the new main sources of company's success that is its intellectual capital.