Мета-трансцендентная этика Л. Витгенштейна
The professor of Catholic University San Antonio (Spain) Joaquin Jareno Alarcon`s book "Religion and relativism in the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein" - one of the possible interpretations of the ideas and attitudes of great Austrian philosopher, an attempt to extract the religious perspective from his controversial legacy, hidden behind the logical categories. The author analyzes in detail the sources of Wittgenstein`s religious thinking; discussions around the relativistic (fideist) interpretations, the Austrian philosopher`s contribution in philosophy and logic of language in general and religious ethics, in particular.
In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein wrote that the sense of the world must lie outside the world. This metaposition has called Wittgenstein’s Platonism, which postulated transcendent view. Basis for the rapprochement of Plato and Wittgenstein attitudes are: problem of generality, hierarchical ontology and the notion of ‘logical form’. Platonism has been considered as a sign of earlier Wittgenstein, but now many scholars insist on Platonism as characteristic of Wittgenstein’s thought in general, that provokes heated disputes.
The questions considered in this review of the recently published book "There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science" by Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read, and Wes Sharrock, pertain to the philosophy of the methodology of social sciences: what research problems can sociology study? is it possible for sociology to study social world as an empirical world, and what consequences will this sociologists' empirical attitude toward their subject have? The review explores how the authors of the book, with the help of Peter Winch's philosophy of the social sciences, criticize the project of sociology as an empirical enterprise. Then their own project of sociology is critically examined.
It turns out, however, that in spite of one basic difference there runs between these two systems a deep and striking parallelism. This parallelism is so close indeed that it makes possible the construction of a vocabulary which would transform characteristic propositions of Wittgenstein's ontology into Aristotelian ones, and conversely. To show in some detail the workings of that transformation will be the subject of this paper.