Критерии оценки качества института частной собственности
Author reviews Russian legal system based on The Russian Constitution (1993) and also considers functioning of basic political institutions and others associated with them. At the same time author analyses reasons of unsatisfactory functioning of particular institutions from the point of view of the Constitution. In particular, author estimates constitutional status of Russian President and reveals his unproportional impact on other political and even civil societies institutions.
The institution of private property has existed in Russia for almost 25 years. However, the legitimacy of private property rights established in this period, as well as the legitimacy of the institution itself, remains questionable. Despite the change of generations and the improvement of living standards, many opinion polls show that the majority of Russians still have a negative view not only of the privatization of the 1990s and its results, but also of private property as such. Optimistic forecasts on the adaptation of people to new realities have not come true. The authors analyze the reasons for and consequences of the illegitimacy of private property rights today and compare different ways of legitimizing these rights. They conclude that there is no sense in discretionary state intervention in this protracted process, and that the focus should be on the reduction of inequality and the enforcement of formal institutions without exception or privilege. © 2017 East View Information Services. All rights reserved.
This paper analyzes the process of renegotiation of the informal contract between the regional and federal elites of Russia after the economic crisis. We use the database of Center of Public Procedures’ “Business against Corruption” to show that, after 2011, regional elites in Russia lost the preexisting opportunity to extract rents from businesses in return for favorable election results for Vladimir Putin and United Russia. We also analyze the connection between the level of corporate raiding in various Russian regions and the political competition, tenure, and ties of their governors. We show that there are two distinct models for fighting raiding in a region: an authoritarian model for suppressing negative signals and a competitive model with the creation of a new consensus among the elites. Although both models are similar in terms of the absence of negative signals, they have very different consequences in the business context of an area.