Европа XVI-XVII вв
Proceedings of the 12th Conference of the European Ornithologists' Union
The era of the Westphalian world order has passed. But the hope associated with its ending that the phenomenon of war will disappear (as it is no longer an acceptable political instrument) was erroneous. The clashes we see today in Syria, Yemen or Libya look like a return to the Thirty Years’ War.
When the Iron Curtain lifted in 1989 it was seen by some as proof of the final demise of the ideas and aspirations of the radical left. Not many years passed, however, before the critique of capitalism and social inequalities were once again the main protest themes of social movements. This book provides an account of radical left movements in today’s Europe and how they are trying to accomplish social and political change. The book’s various chapters focus on social movement organizations, activist groups, and networks that are rooted in the left-wing ideologies of anarchism, Marxism, socialism, and communism in both newly democratized post-communist and longstanding liberal-democratic polities. The questions addressed include: How are radical left movements influenced by the political and social contexts in which they are situated? How do they interact with other political actors? How does contemporary radical left activism differ from “new” and “old” social movements on the one hand, and radical left parliamentary parties on the other? And what does it mean to be ”radical left” in liberal-democratic (or semi-democratic, or even semi-authoritarian), capitalist European societies today after the fall of state socialism.
In this article, I analyze ‘liberal’ constructions of the ‘Enlightenment’ idea, as it appears in the Greek public sphere. The study is based on the analysis of articles published in two popular news/lifestyle websites, 'AthensVoice' and 'Protagon', during the years of the ongoing 'Greek crisis'. Discourse theory, informed by critical discourse analysis, is deployed to analyze these discursive articulations. The analysis shows that Greece's economic/social/political problems are viewed as mere symptoms that underline Greece’s fundamental deficit, which is the country's ‘lack of 'Enlightenment’. The article concludes that such discourses are part of a biopolitical, disciplinary framework producing the object to be reformed by austerity: a ‘un-Enlightened’ ‘Greek character’, ‘guilty’ for ‘self-inflicting’ Greece’s crisis. This ‘reform of character’ envisioned by (neo)liberals in Greece and elsewhere, is supposed to emerge through the institutional advance of neoliberal reforms such as indefinite austerity and privatizations, conditions to foster the entrepreneurial, mobile and austere subject.
European countries are culturally close, still showing great variance in political participation rates as well as in predominant religions and state-church relations experience, what makes this region a good case for comparative research. Given this, it becomes important to study if members of different confessions differ in political participation rates, or the main cleavage lies between religious and non-religious people regardless of religious tradition? Does Orthodoxy really lead to lower levels of political participation or what we see is the effect of political regime or Communist legacy? Statistical analysis results suggest that regular attendance of religious services and praying does increase chances to participate in politics. This pattern holds for followers of all major European religious traditions and in countries with different predominant religions. On the other hand, most inter-confessional differences in political participation appear weak and unstable, while both belonging to an Orthodox religious tradition and living in a predominantly Orthodox state exert a stable and negative effect on political participation. Additional tests suggest that there is no difference in political participation between Orthodox Christians from predominantly Orthodox states and those where they form only a minority. Consequently, it is something in a religious tradition itself that decreases political participation.
The Petrine-Pushkinian era lasted no more than two hundred years. It originated at the Battle of Poltava, where Russian troops first showed themselves not just equal to the Swedes, who were otherwise the best European troops at the time, but even surpassed them. Russia became a part of Europe. As both poets and historians (Fyodor Tyutchev, Vasilii Kliuchevskii) have said, Peter the Great’s empire rose in response to Charles the Great’s, just as Russian state power rose in response to its Roman-German counterparts. Peter declared Russia an empire in 1721, giving it both a supra-confessional and supranational idea, creating a legal framework, the first step toward freedom of man. Pushkin sang the work of Peter, imbuing the new capital, Petersburg, with a soul. This allowed Georgy Fedotov to call Pushkin a singer of both empire and freedom. The October Revolution of the 1917 and Civil War, that broke out in late 1917, served as the tragic end to the era.
This article examines that all basic elements of a post-bipolar European system of collective security have been put to the test. This is largely due to the accumulation of a certain amount of “dysfunctions” and “threats” within the post-bipolar security system itself.