Совершенствование региональной политики государства
In the wake of the Russian transition to a market economy, the interaction of new post-Soviet business and regional/local government has become one of the most important issues on the political agenda. "Business-power" relations has also become one of the most important and popular themes in scholarly study. But there remains a need for a more scientific background to the study of this question.
Th is article examines the transformation of the determinants of electoral behavior in the elections for the regional executive and legislative power until 2013. Th e author comes to the conclusion that the instrumental model of the explanations of electoral behavior in the elections for the Legislative Assembly is not functional in the analysis of recent election cycles. At the same time, the voting in the gubernatorial elections, earlier explained by ideological identifi cation, has close connection with socio-economic models. Finally, the author provides several key explanations of this transformation: the volatility of electoral preferences, the restrictions of voters in assessing the benefi ts and costs of choice and the infl uence of informal institutions and practices on the regional election process.
A political scientist examines how regional elites shape the electoral fortunes of Russia’s hegemonic party, United Russia (UR). Using original data on regional legislative elections from 2003 to 2011, we show that UR performs better in those regions where regional governors control strong political machines. Russia’s leadership undercut its own electoral strategy by replacing popular elected governors with colorless bureaucrats who struggled to mobilize votes on behalf of United Russia. This is one of the reasons for United Russia’s poor performance in recent elections.
Business and politics are closely connected. Many members of the business elite are members of influential interest groups. In democratic polyarchies, western students of political science have noted the disproportionate influence of large economic corporations in the political process. The role of economic corporations with their resources and political interests is one o f the reasons for a deformation of polyarchies, in which the dispersion of power is far from even.