О размещении заказов посредством одношаговых аукционов
Antitrust legislation of many countries admits horizontal agreements between market participants as illegal per se not only in case of price fixing, market sharing, but also in case of bid-riggings. This paper has presented a review and an academic assessment of market participants behavior at auctions by bidding. Such behavior creates incentives to collude and to sustain a collusion but with some features which are suitable for auctions. These suitable features for auctions are in detail described in the paper of R. Preston Mcafee and John Mcmillan “Bidding Ring”. In order to collude, the bidders must resolve their asymmetric-information problem: they must have some way of selecting a winner and a winning bid. So the main characteristic of auction by bidding is asymmetric information. The knowledge is non-uniform distributed between the parties to the contract: the seller does not know a demand of auction by bidding participants. Otherwise the seller would know what price it is worth to set.
In our paper we used these features and the conditions of collusion’ sustainability to give academic assessment of market participants behavior at the auctions by bidding. We showed that the cartel sustainability in the conditions of e-auction corresponds to balance of profit and expected fine imposed in the case of cartel detection but not corresponds to discount factor as an indicator of “cartel sustainability”. The cases of Russian antitrust practice which are devoted to the auction by bidding in the pharmaceutical market gave us an opportunity to show how the firms use the price strategies to keep the prices at the rate which give them to earn monopoly profits.
Russian legislation prescribes some cases of compulsory tendering in certain areas. Tender regulation is divided into two groups – the tender regulation for «sale» and tender regulation for «buy». The first group includes those types of compulsory tenders, where the state authorities, local authorities, other organizers of the tenders are the seller of the property (privatization, «land tenders», «forest tenders», tenders for sale of confiscated property and other types of compulsory tenders (total of at least 10 types of tenders). The second group of tenders are those tenders where the buyer acts as purchaser of products (government procurement). Federal law of December 6, 2011 № 401-FZ (the third package of antitrust regulation) has begun the process of unification of regulation of the first group of tenders. The law provides for an uniform procedure for appeals and uniform requirements for publishing information on tenders.