Paper deals with definition and types of “human shields”, limits scope of prohibition to use “human shields” in armed conflicts and defines duties of the parties of the armed conflict. It analyses different approaches to the status of “human shields” and applicability of the principle of proportionality to them.
This monograph is dedicated to both theoretical and practical problems of joint application of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law norms in armed conflicts. Special emphasis is made on the contradictions between norms of both branches of International Law in the sphere of protection of right to life and right to liberty. Conclusions made by the author are based on the analysis of norms of International Law, practice of their application by international organizations and states, decisions of the International Court of Justice, The UN Human Rights Committee, The European Court of Human Rights, The Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, The African Commission on Human' and Peoples' Rights, international and mixed criminal courts and tribunals, as well as legal literature.
For a long time it has been taken for granted that a non-governmental party to the armed conflict should respect basic human rights only to the extent provided by the sources of International Humanitarian Law. On the basis of international treaties and customs, state practice and doctrinal works, the author concludes that a new international custom is emerging under which – as far as it is objectively possible – International Human Rights Law imposes obligations on the non-governmental armed groups as parties to the armed conflict exercising elements of governmental authority.
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights made a contribution to the development of the theoretical conceptions describing relationship between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law by specifying direction to a wider application of human rights norms regulating right to life in armed conflicts. This article deals with three main directions of this development: firstly, the strengthening of examination in sphere of fulfillment by states of their negative obligations concerning right to life, secondly, specification of duties on preventive measures serving for protection of civil persons and objects, and, thirdly, enlargement of the scope of application of the obligation on prosecution of lethal cases in armed conflicts.
The prohibition of perfidy in treaty law and customary international law is subject to two main restrictions, both of which should be overcome. The first limitation is connected with the introduction of the explicit ban of perfidy only in respect of acts directed to killing, injuring or capture. Despite arguments favouring the existence of the prohibition of perfidy per se, the wording of Art. 37 Additional Protocol I has influenced the growth of support of the strict approach. This approach is dangerous as it encourages the abuse of the norms of international law applicable in armed conflicts and elaborate tactics based on the so-called ‘grey zone’, and also retrograde, as it constitutes a step back in comparison to the long existing rules of honour on the battlefield. The prohibition of perfidy is subjected to a second limitation in the formulation of the war crime as perfidious killing or injury, although, at least, capture should be regarded as reaching the level of severity necessary for qualification of the act as an international crime. At the same time, the existence of a general and unequivocal prohibition of perfidy and strengthening of the responsibility for perfidy are even more needed in the circumstances surrounding contemporary armed conflicts and asymmetrical warfare.
Terrorism poses an undeniable threat to societies throughout the world today. Martyr terrorism, the latest growing form of terrorist activity, and arguably the most effective, has become a regular occurrence. But how has terrorist activity evolved in the last 100 years, and what are the ethical costs of terrorism? In this informative book, three philosophers, all experts in the ethics of conflict, examine the various definitions of terrorism and the nature of martyr terrorism. Through accounts of terrorist campaigns, from nineteenth century Russian terrorism, to the twentieth century campaigns in Ireland, Israel and Greece, and contemporary campaigns in Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, the book explores the ethical implications of terrorism from a philosophical perspective. Setting out the social, psychological and political causes of terrorism, the book interrogates the cases for and against terrorist activity in terms of just war theory.
Not all cases of targeted killings occurring in armed conflicts, which could have been regarded to be legal under provisions of IHL, would stay examination under criteria of a new complex approach. Far from majority of these targeted killings would satisfy to the requirements of a prudent preparation and planning, absolute necessity, strict proportionality and an effective investigation. However, as a result, it cannot be argued that all cases of intended use of force against concrete persons suspected to be members of armed groups or civilians taking a direct part in hostilities during armed conflicts are illegal. There remains a small group of situations, in which the whole range of circumstances will justify these actions, but overwhelming majority of them will be situated in the real “combat” sector of military operations. Application of the “complex test” would definitely have a significant impact on the grey areas, rendering almost all of cases belonging to it out of law.