Эффективность инновационных объединений
This article focuses on the development of antitrust policy in transition economies in the context of preventing explicit and tacit collusion. Experience of Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the creation of antitrust institutions was analyzed, including both legislation and enforcement practice, in particular, unique features in the use of "rule of reason" approach. Also were shown problems that still remain actual for transition economies in this area, including the problem of cooperation between competition authority and police system and the standard of proof problem in the case of collusion. These countries in the early 90th were in similar socio – economic conditions and were forced to create completely new institutions in the field of protection of competition. It is shown that existing quantitative ratings of competition can’t be regarded as certain final assessment of the effectiveness of antitrust policy. The article proposes a special approach to evaluation of preventing collusion mechanisms, based on the institutional analysis. This approach takes into account such enforcement problems as: classification problems (tacit vs explicit collusion, vertical vs horizontal agreements), flexibility of prohibitions (“per se” vs “rule of reason”), design of sanctions, private enforcement challenge, leniency program mechanisms, the role of antitrust authorities, especially in criminal investigation issues etc.
Natural gas demand growth has been increasing for the past decades. The us, China and India are becoming large gas importers, without mentioning the eu. The chase for cleaner environment drives developed countries into the "gas-or-nuclear" corner, and most of them go for the gas option, while their developing peers may not have a second option at all. The eu and the us gas production is declining, and they are becoming, therefore, increasingly dependent on imports. Most other big gas consumers are initially dependent due to not having their own natural gas reserves. In the meantime, the world leading gas producing countries already want to coordinate their actions. The issues such as gas pricing, directions of exports, coordination of volumes and new project development are in focus of their attention. The importers, on the other hand, have good reasons to be afraid of such alliance and the "gas weapon" – ironically, most of the major gas producers and reserves-holders are Middle-East Arabic countries, some of which are already members of oil cartel.