When a society needs to take a collective decision one could apply some aggregation method, particularly, voting. One of the main problems with voting is manipulation. We say a voting rule is vulnerable to manipulation if there exists at least one voter who can achieve a better voting result by misrepresenting his or her preferences. The popular approach to comparing manipulability of voting rules is defining complexity class of the corresponding manipulation problem. This paper provides a survey into manipulation complexity literature considering variety of problems with different assumptions and restrictions.
Since 9/11, terrorism has become a global issue of the twenty-first century. Terrorist organizations become important actors of world politics as they gain influence on political process and decision-making. Some organizations compete with each other in order to gain more power and influence. We study the distribution of power among terrorist groups using network approach and applying classic and new centrality indices (Short-Range (SRIC) and Long-Range interactions indices (LRIC)). These indices allow to identify terrorist groups with direct and indirect influence on the terrorist network.