«С каким видом трансцендентального идеализма несовместим эмпирический реализм?» – П.Ф. Стросон о «главной ошибке» Канта
This paper outlines a utopic reading of the Kantian origin of German Idealism, which in turn implies and necessitates a rearticulation of the concept of utopia. In this optic, utopia ceases to be a mere idealistic vision of the future and becomes, first and foremost, a utopian method and standpoint from which Kantian idealism begins. Utopia, in this sense, originates as if at a distance from the real, but in such a way that it remains impossible to reach it from within reality; any such transition would have to remain, at best, an infinite approximation. It is therefore pointless to expect utopia — one can only begin from it. This implies a different, non-Spinozan immanence, which this paper characterizes as utopian and discovers in Kant. On this reading, transcendental idealism, as non-realism, suspends the real and starts from a “non-place,” refusing to think the emergence of the ideal from any environment or the in-itself. This non-place is reduplicated as an immanent, non-dualist facticity from which the subject of idealism proceeds to think and act. Idealism thus implies a utopian structure (non-relation), operation (suspension), and temporality (futurity-as-facticity), which, taken together, suggest a different way of looking at the continuity between Kant and post-Kantian idealism, as well as a way to think immanence as non-Spinozistic — and even as deconstructing Spinozism — while also avoiding any dualism, including that of the religious-secular binary.
Frangeskou’s point of departure in his juxtaposition of Levinas and Kant is the problem of transcendental schematism and not the tension between autonomy and heteronomy as in most of the published literature. Thus the middle ground between Levinas and Kant is occupied by Heidegger, but also by Franz Rosenzweig with his “biblical” version of ecstatic temporality. Levinassian diachrony is described by Frangeskou as a new form of ecstatic temporality, different from those of Heidegger and Rosenzweig, and as an analogue of transcendental schematism of reason. We briefly compare Frangeskou’s interpretation with Marc Richir’s notion of transcendental schematism which also goes back to Levinassian diachronic temporality. Richir’s schematism functions as a medium joining together heterogenous elements such as the layer of ‘phenomenological’, that is, unstable and flickering sense, and the layer of ‘symbolic’, that is, organised and stabilised sense. In a similar way, for Frangeskou, diachronic temporality provides a synthesis (though not synchronisation) of God, world and man.