Explaining the Korean War through the Lens of the Bargaining Model of War
The Korean War was the first military clash of the Cold War, and the first international conflict where the UN Security Council intervened, the war waged for political objectives, the civil conflict — the Korean War marked to be distinctive in a variety of ways. Overall, the Korean was a bifurcation point that shaped the contours of the bipolar rivalry, with regional conflicts treated as cases to demonstrate supremacy by the two superpowers [Robert Jervis, pp. 563–592]. The disclosure of the Soviet (and partially Chinese) archives in the 1990s encouraged new wave of research on the causality of the war [Alexandre Y. Mansourov, 1996]. High-level documents on the Korean War were presented by the Russian President Boris Yeltsin to President Kim Young Sam of the Republic of Korea in 1994. However, the Korean War despite its pivotal importance has not received sufficiently ample attention from scholars of international relations that would have produced a broad theoretically informed scholarship. A valuable contribution to the mainstream theories of International Relations, the bargaining theory offers useful theoretical explanations on the outbreak of the war, the course of combat, and the war termination.