Эконометрическое оценивание риска на финансовых рынках и его связь с гипотезой эффективности рынка.
The problem of conflicts between the financial industry professionals’ business interests and the SROs' regulatory activities is studied in this paper. With the help of the elaborated methods the intensity of the US SROs conflicts of interest is revealed since 1991 till 2010 on the basis of the industry professionals’ individual preferences with regard to financial market efficiency. We determined that the professionals gained the maximal accumulated portfolio value provided systematic deviation of the market from normality (efficiency). The professionals’ goals of utility maximization did not match the SROs’ goals of the due market regulation in accordance with the regulator and international organizations requirements. These methods and results could be used in decision making about the allocation of financial market regulatory powers between regulator and SRO.
The paper studies collective preferences of the financial self-regulatory organizations (SRO) with regard to financial market inefficiency. A model of financial industry professionals' combined utility dependence on their collective preferences parameters was analyzed. It was determined that it is unreasonable to allocate enforcement regulatory powers to SROs, because proper SRO enforcement contradicts to the commercial interests of its members. But, simultaneously, the commercial interests of the industry professionals are aligned with SRO rulemaking interests. SRO can be a highly efficient institute in regulatory rules and financial market infrastructure design. It is also shown that the proposed parameters of the US SROs' activity are closely related to the World Bank US governance indicators. It was determined that these parameters are institutional in their nature and can serve as indicators of the financial market regulatory system quality.
The paper deals with the collective behavior of the US financial industry professionals. A relative majority voting procedure is proposed as a means of their preferences aggregation. Parameters of the US SRO activity that are based on the quantitavely revealed SRO preferences with regard to market efficiency are introduced and studied. The relationship between these parameters and the functions of representative investor risk aversion is also considered. It was shown that the parameters can serve as market integrity indexes.