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Влияние эгоистических и кооперативных инвестиций на взаимодействие партнеров
С. 63–66.
This report analyzes the key trends when considering the concept of specific investments, as a party receives the partner positive effects of their implementation have a significant impact on the possibility of further interaction. In modern literature, there is no single definition is not specific investments, in some works the notion of selfish-specific investments in other cooperative specific investments. It is therefore relevant to assess their effect on the behavior of the parties and the conclusions of the authors of contemporary works.
Dzagurova N., Journal of Institutional Studies 2019 Vol. 11 No. 2 P. 28–43
The paper discusses an alternative to vertical integration – the vertical restraints (VRs)
which have been the subject of numerous studies in neo-institutional economics. It offers a
new approach to analysis of vertical restraints as voluntary self-restraints in the situations of
uncertainty. Not limited to consideration of uncertainty generated by market shocks (Rey and
Tirole, 1986; Hansen and Motta, ...
Added: July 28, 2019
Dzagurova N., Журнал институциональных исследований 2016 Т. 8 № 4 С. 53–71
The present article continues the discussion of the theme raised in our preceding article published in the second issue of JIS this year. That article contained the analysis of vertical restraints (VR) set out in (Rey & Tirole, 1986) and (Hansen & Motta, 2015). We proposed an alternative approach, namely, the interpretation of VR as ...
Added: February 16, 2017
Agamirova M., Dzagurova N., Экономическая политика 2016 Т. 11 № 6 С. 122–137
The underinvestment in the specific assets due to the «hold up» is one of the key issues in the theory of the firm. Till the very end of the twentieth century discussing the «hold up» problem researchers considered only the so-called «selfish» relation-specific investments. But later their attention was switched to the analysis of another specific ...
Added: February 8, 2017
Dzagurova N., Журнал институциональных исследований 2016 Т. 8 № 2 С. 22–37
Abstract. Vertical restraints such as exclusive territories may be considered as an alternative to the compensation paid to retailers for taking the risks associated with market shocks . For the first time this approach has been put forward in (Rey & Tirole, 1986). In (Hansen & Motta, 2015) this concept has been further developed, but these ...
Added: January 15, 2017
Agamirova M., Журнал институциональных исследований 2015 Т. 7 № 3 С. 64–75
The problem of underinvestment in specific assets is a key issue in new institutional economics, especially in case of cooperative relation specific investments. It can be solved due to vertical restraints, as an alternative way of vertical integration to transfer control to partner, who makes relation specific investments. The type of relation-specific investments called «cooperative» ...
Added: February 8, 2016
Agamirova M., Dzagurova N., Экономическая политика 2014 № 4 С. 79–97
The paper investigates the interaction between the economic theory and the antitrust law. It argues that the widespread belief that theoretical analysis played a crucial role in the regulation norms evolution sometimes is not “history friendly”. The paper focuses
on the regulation of vertical restraints. It contains a comparative time analysis of the key US antitrust cases concerning the ...
Added: February 8, 2016
Dzagurova N., Agamirova M., Журнал институциональных исследований 2014 Т. 6 № 4 С. 65–76
Since mid-seventies the «hold-up» problem caused the underinvestment in specific assets has been remaining a key issue in neo-institutional economics. The traditional theoretical analysis of «hold-up» problem was based on consideration of so-called «selfish» relation-specific investments. Another type of relation-specific investments called «cooperative» investments (or cross investments) was nearly absent in economic analysis up to ...
Added: February 8, 2016
Dzagurova N., Агамирова М. Е., Журнал институциональных исследований 2014 Т. 6 № 4 С. 65–76
Since mid-seventies the «hold-up» problem caused the underinvestment in specific assets has been remaining a key issue in neo-institutional economics. The traditional theoretical analysis of «hold-up» problem was based on consideration of so-called «selfish» relation-specific investments. Another type of relation-specific investments called «cooperative» investments (or cross investments) was nearly absent in economic analysis up to the very end of the twentieth ...
Added: February 13, 2015
Агамирова М. Е., Dzagurova N., Экономическая политика 2014 № 4 С. 79–97
The paper investigates the interaction between the economic theory and the antitrust law. It argues that the widespread belief that theoretical analysis played a crucial role in the regulation norms evolution sometimes is not “history friendly”. The paper focuses on the regulation of vertical restraints. It contains a comparative time analysis of the key US ...
Added: October 1, 2014
Невидомская М. А., Вопросы регулирования экономики 2012 Т. 3 № 4 С. 44–58
Данная статья посвящена теоретическим исследованиям динамических постановок проблемы hold-up, касающихся проблематики последовательного (неповторяемого) инвестирования. Наряду с этим выявлено неоднозначное отношение различных научных публикаций, на примере «Hold-up and sequential specific investment» Smirnov and White (2004) и «Sequential Investment, Hold-up, and Strategic Delay» J. Zhang And Y. Zhang (2011), к последовательному режиму инвестирования в качестве возможного способа ...
Added: February 8, 2013
Невидомская М. А., Наукові праці Донецького державного технічного університету. Серія: економічна 2011 Т. 3 № 40 С. 173–178
Данная статья посвящена теоретическим и эмпирическим исследованиям проблемы «заложника», имеющей место при заключении эксклюзивных соглашений. Кроме того, в рамках данного анализа дается новое объяснение повышения эффективности вертикальных взаимодействий в результате заключения ВОС, основанное на применении метода реальных опционов к рассмотрению динамической постановки проблемы «заложника», отличающейся варьированием не объемов, а сроков осуществления специфических инвестиций. ...
Added: November 21, 2012