Продовольственный потенциал как фактор внешнеполитического влияния
This article is aimed to analyse the aptitude of numbering the “food power” among the factors of impact on world economy and policy. The author gives several examples, which illustrate the possibility to convert economic measures, connected with agricultural and trade policy of state, into political weapon.
The paper studies empirically competition on regional markets for banking services in Russia. Bank-level statistics collected in two adjacent Russian regions, namely Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, enabled to compare these markets. Estimation based on Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse model suggests that both regional markets are featured by monopolistic competition. Contrary to ex ante expectations, intensity of competition in Bashkortostan turned out to be higher than in Tatarstan. There is found no convincing statistical proof to the theoretical hypothesis that market power dynamics are driven by market structure, i.e. by the degree of market concentration in the hands of top players.
The digital economy is gradually gaining traction through a variety of recent technological developments, including the introduction of the Internet of things, artificial intelligence and markets for data. This innovative book contains contributions from leading competition law scholars who map out and investigate the anti-competitive effects that are developing in the digital economy.
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine new rules of exchange in retailer-supplier relationships imposed by the retail chains, to analyse factors facilitating this institutional change and to reveal the links between channel power and relational conflicts. Design/methodology/approach: Survey data were collected from 500 managers of retail chains and their suppliers in five Russian cities. The sample includes firms of different sizes that sell food and home electronic appliances. After the diffusion of new contract arrangements is examined, logistic regression models are constructed to evaluate major sources of relational conflicts. Findings: The findings indicate that power-advantaged firms disseminate new rules of exchange effectively. However, relational conflicts largely originate not from these new demands but from the frequent contract infringements by both exchange parties. Research limitations/implications: The study is confined to two sectors of retail trade in one country. Further research is required to determine the effects on channel relationships of the financial crisis and of the adoption of restrictive federal legislation. Practical implications: Practitioners should recognise the need to provide socio-political legitimacy for the new rules of exchange. Otherwise, they may face relational conflicts and provoke restrictive state regulations. Public officials should know that relational conflicts may originate largely from opportunistic behaviour by exchange parties rather than from abuse of market power. Originality/value: This paper presents the first systematic quantitative study of retailer-supplier relationships in Russia. It investigates institutional change and relational conflicts as perceived by both exchange parties.
This empirical paper adds to competition and industrial organization literature by exploring the interplay between industry structure and competitiveness on local, rather than nation-wide, markets. We use micro-level statistical data for banks in two Russian regions (Bashkortostan and Tatarstan) to estimate Herfindahl-Hirschman index, Lerner index, and Panzar-Rosse model. We estimate Panzar-Rosse model in two ways: via the widely used price-equation that accounts for scale effects and then via a revenue-equation that disregards scale effects as suggested by Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk (2009). We find both regional markets to be ruled by monopolistic competition, although estimation by revenue-equation does not reject monopoly hypothesis for Tatarstan. Existence of sizeable locally-owned and operated institutions does not necessarily lead to higher competitiveness of the given regional market. Non-structural methods of estimation suggest that bank competition in Bashkortostan is stronger than in Tatarstan.