Healthcare, like any area of human activity involving the use of limited resources of society, faces two primary objectives: achieving efficiency and fairness in the provision of medical services. As is well known, in most cases the competitive market ensures the optimal allocation of resources.
However, healthcare has some distinctive features which give rise to market failure in this area, resulting in state intervention in the economic relations between the providers (hospitals and doctors) and consumers of medical services, and leads to the emergence of the institution of insurance. The economic aspects of healthcare predetermine a special mechanism for the functioning of this market, and allow us to talk of special types of competition in this sector. The aim of this article is to describe and analyse manifestations of market failure in healthcare in order to subsequently develop measures to reduce costs and increase the profitability of this area.
The game-theoretic model developed in this article formulates the conditions required for the incorporation the corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy into the business as a mechanism of signaling. The model is based on the following principles: the Cournot model, the segmentation of consumers by their health deterioration risk attitude, the choice about CSR strategy by producers of low and high quality of food products. Results of the model show that the nonoccurrence of CSR in Russia is subject to the small share of health-conscious consumers and the lack of support and regulation of the state.
In the given paper the aggregated randomized indices method is modified for credit scoring. Coefficients of the modified method can be calibrated on a massive training set in comparison with a standard version. Different credit scoring models are analyzed, i.e. with a binary scale and a continuous one. The Monte Carlo method is applied to measure the efficiency of models.