Стратегическое поведение в Суде Европейского союза: Лонгитюдное исследование юриспруденции суда по статье 36 Римского договора
The article develops a model of rational judicial decision making for the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The model suggests that judges may strategically incentivise litigants to bring particular cases to the court in order to promote their preferred issues to the agenda, and to control the docket. This so called strategic approach was developed primarily in research on the US Supreme Court and does not travel too well to other cases. Author finds a way to test its findings on an organizationally completely different entity of the European Court of Justice. To do so he narrows the research to ECJ case law on restrictions to free movement of goods within the EU, gathers some data on the number of cases decided by the ECJ annually, and checks it against the development of the case law and the substance of court rulings. Author finds that the ECJ succeeds at manipulating the case supply by changing the litigants' perception of their chances to win, and suggests that further research is conducted into the other areas of EU case law to corroborate this finding.